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This thesis examines the question: Can law enforcement officers across multiple 
jurisdictions benefit from lessons learned in combat environments about medical 
training?  It compares the medical training requirements of U.S. military forces with 
those of various police units. It specifically investigates how military lessons in tactical 
medicine pertain to the various police departments’ medical training requirements.   
The study finds that the main lesson police officers can take from the military is 
to build community-specific medical training based on unique law enforcement needs 
and available assets. The military attempts to use hard data surrounding soldiers’ work 
environments, access to medical care, and common modes of injury to design its medical 
training. Police officers should also design law-enforcement-specific medical training 
based on their assets and specific work environment. Additionally, a more detailed 
reporting system regarding police officer fatalities would support the officers’ data 
collection, which would likely help improve police officer tactical medical training. 
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This thesis examines the question: Can law enforcement officers across multiple 
jurisdictions benefit from lessons learned in combat environments about medical 
training?  It compares the medical training requirements of U.S. military forces with 
those of federal, state, tribal, Forest Service, and conservation police units. (Forest 
Service and conservation police departments are referred to generally herein as 
“wilderness police departments.”)  It specifically investigates how military lessons in 
tactical medicine pertain to the various police departments’ medical training 
requirements.   
The study finds that the main lesson police officers can take from the military is 
to build community-specific medical training based on unique law enforcement needs 
and available assets. The U.S. Special Operations Command attempts to use hard data 
surrounding soldiers’ work environments, access to medical care, and common modes of 
injury to design its medical training. This method for designing military-specific medical 
training began after realizing that civilian medicine is insufficient for a soldier’s use. 
Police officers should also design law-enforcement-specific medical training based on 
their assets and specific work environment. Law enforcement personnel should be 
hesitant to adopt military tactical medicine solely on the grounds that police officers too 
work in a tactical environment, unsuitable for standard civilian emergency medical 
training. While portions of the military’s medical training curriculum are useful for police 
officers, some medical techniques used by soldiers are not suitable in the context of 
civilian law enforcement. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Military tactical medicine has made major improvements in the last two decades. 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) is the name of a set of medical procedures or 
interventions developed by special operators to bridge the gap between military and 
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civilian emergency medical service (EMS) needs.1  Since TCCC’s development and 
adoption by special operators, its transition into use throughout the military has been 
expanding continuously. Due to TCCC’s acknowledged value and success in saving 
soldiers’ lives in a combat environment, various police departments have recognized its 
potential for saving the lives of their officers, who are often required to work in 
combative settings. Although some law enforcement agencies have adopted TCCC as a 
foundation for police officer tactical medicine, where it is often referred to as Tactical 
Emergency Medical Support (TEMS), not enough research has explored how TCCC 
should be adapted for civilian use. Furthermore, no standard tactical medical training has 
been adopted by police jurisdictions nationwide. 
The National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), with 30,000 members 
throughout the United States, is a leading organization dedicated to enhancing the 
performance of law enforcement personnel by providing a training resource and forum 
for the development of tactics and information exchange. NTOA and multiple law 
enforcement agencies, including the FBI, endorse the use of modified TCCC training to 
support law enforcement officers in carrying out their missions.2   
In a law enforcement context, a tactical medical setting is often one that involves 
a prolonged-transport environment with minimal EMS assets; it may or may not involve 
an armed conflict component. Tactical medical training is useful for police officers 
during day-to-day operations as well as when their EMS resources are blocked or slowed. 
If injured in a combative tactical setting, officers must provide self-
assessments/treatments or give care to teammates until hostilities have ceased. TCCC 
interventions are useful to know during daily operations, because certain wounds can 
                                                
1 This thesis uses the general term special operators to include a variety of soldiers, sailors, and 
marines in the special operations community. TCCC was originally developed and adopted by members of 
the U.S. Special Operations Command. The Department of Defense activated the Special Operations 
Command on 16 April 1987. The command is comprised of approximately 57,000 active duty, Reserve, 
and National Guard Soldiers, Sailor, Airmen, Marines, and DoD civilians. The primary training center for 
Special Operations’ Combat Medicine is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Here special operators from 
multiple branches of the service—including Air Force Parajumpers, Army Rangers and Special Forces, 
Navy SEALs, and Marine Forced Recon—come together to receive medical training. In this document, 
members from the U.S. Special Operations Command are referred to generally as special operators.  
2 Richard B. Schwartz, MD, et al., Tactical Medicine—Competency-Based Guidelines, Prehospital 
Emergency Care 2011, 15:67–82. 
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cause an officer to die in minutes. Other causes of death have a slower onset. Although 
many fatalities might be preventable by EMS in normal conditions, various elements can 
alter EMS response, including situations that put EMS providers in danger. One good 
example of a situation that delayed EMS backup occurred in 1997 in North Hollywood, 
California, where a gun battle lasted for 44 minutes. In this case it was the bank robber 
instead of the police officer who died from a gunshot wound to the leg because EMS 
units were restricted for safety, but it could have been the other way around.3   
Although police officers might not have to deal with response times that are as 
delayed as the medical evacuation platforms can be in the military, they are often faced 
with extended EMS response time. Slow EMS response time is especially a frequent 
problem in rural areas and during mass casualty scenarios when EMS assets are 
overwhelmed. Even when EMS response time is reliable, dangers inherent in law 
enforcement combined with police officers working locations is often problematic. In 
tactical situations, a police officer must have the ability to administer basic life-saving 
medicine while minimizing the threat to others and controlling the scene. In short, tactical 
medical training enables police officers to accomplish their missions. News reports such 
as those surrounding the Fort Hood shooting, when an Army medic saved Officer 
Kimberly Munley’s life by applying a Combat Application Tourniquet, confirm that 
tactical medicine will save police officers’ lives. If not for the medic’s training and quick 
access to a tourniquet, officer Munley might have died.4 
Similar to how the military developed its medical training, police officers should 
focus their medical training on law enforcement specific injuries, medical assets, and 
work environment. Soldiers receiving medical training learn to weigh any TCCC 
intervention for importance based on two factors: first, how quickly the injury it is 
designed to treat can lead to death; and, second, how frequently that injury is likely to 
                                                
3 John B. Alexander, Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement, Joint 
Special Operations University, 2010. 
4 Frank K Butler, MD & Richard Carmona, MD, “Tactical Combat Casualty Care: From the 
Battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq to the Streets of America,” The Tactical Edge, (Winter 2012): 86-91, 
http://www.ntoa.org/massemail/CarmonaW12.pdf; John B. Alexander, Convergence: Special Operations 
Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement, Joint Special Operations University, 2010. 
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occur. For example, a soldier is trained to recognize and treat a life-threatening extremity 
bleed as a primary intervention, because casualties can die in minutes from this wound 
and because this injury is the leading cause of preventable death among battle casualties. 
Law enforcement medical training should be influenced by the same two criteria. Each 
officer has the potential to be wounded; his or her response afterward will depend on the 
officer’s training and could result in life or death consequences for the officer as well as 
innocent civilians. It is essential that police officers learn the tactical medicine that is best 
suited to their individual role.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Officers who are not trained in tactical medicine will lack necessary tools to 
perform their job when put in a disaster scenario. If an officer is injured in the line of 
duty but does not know how to respond, the officer’s life and the lives of others are in 
immediate danger. One problem is that no comprehensive study using definitive medical 
or forensic data has been conducted to understand the common injuries that officers will 
likely encounter. Another is that no standard police officer medical training has been 
developed. The dissimilarities between jurisdictional training programs surpass minor 
nuances like the length or depth of training programs for individual units. The differences 
are vast and often based on uninformed local EMS training standards, which vary state to 
state and are frequently not tested in a field environment.5   
Another problem is that some officers do not understand the importance of 
tactical medical training. Without receiving this training, they do not know that 
hemorrhage from their leg could result in death in three minutes and are instead falsely 
comforted with the knowledge that EMS capabilities are in relatively close proximity. 
Police officers who perceive medical training as trivial can add to the problem of 
developing a standard set of medical procedures for their community by resisting 
                                                
5 Emergency Care Coordination Center, Emergency Care Coordination Center Strategic Plan FY 2012 
– FY 2016, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at Health and Human Services, 2012; 
American Medical Association, Improving Health System Preparedness for Terrorism and Mass Casualty 
Events: Recommendations for Action, 2007; California Emergency Medical Services Authority, 
http://www.emsa.ca.gov/; Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United 
States Health System, Emergency Medical Services: At the Crossroads (Future of Emergency Care), 
Institute of Medicine, 2006. 
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cooperation with medical researchers. Furthermore, even when research supports training 
and the adoption of a particular medical intervention or technique, restricted departmental 
funding and lack of spare training time can serve as obstacles to making any real change.  
Non-tactical civilian EMS training programs have restrictions that are designed to 
protect patients from potential injuries that can be caused by emergency medical 
procedures. For instance, to protect the patient’s cervical spine, medical responders must 
take great precautions to immobilize the neck before transporting the patient. Tourniquets 
have long been avoided due to fears that they can cause injury to the affected extremity; 
therefore, more complicated pressure dressings are often preferred over tourniquets. 
These precautions add time to the treatment process that can risk care providers’ and 
patients’ lives in a tactical environment.   
Although many law enforcement agencies have ignored the caution of civilian 
EMS authorities and adopted controversial TCCC interventions like the tourniquet, there 
remain problems with applying military medicine to police units. Military professionals 
designed TCCC to be used in different scenarios than many law enforcement officers 
generally encounter and with a different level of assets. In terms of performing a medical 
procedure, soldiers who work in teams, even small ones, have an advantage over 
members of a police force who patrol alone. On the other hand, soldiers usually operate 
with less direct support from EMS teams and can have a more delayed transport to 
advanced medical care. These discrepancies need to be measured and evaluated. This 
study addresses the issue that more research must be done concerning TCCC’s relevancy, 
especially for single-unit patrol officers.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The military medical training known as TCCC developed after the lack of 
helicopter support during the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 resulted in a fifteen-
hour delay in transporting the casualties. That incident indicated to military medical 
experts that standard civilian EMS training and procedures, such as those taught in 
Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS)—which up until then had been used in the 
military—were not applicable to the combat environment. These lessons were presented 
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along with historical data concerning mechanisms of injury among military casualties in a 
groundbreaking paper published in 1996, Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special 
Operations. Since civilian medical training was determined insufficient, the military 
adopted methods that challenged and defied civilian medicine. Since then, U.S. military 
after-action reports from Iraq and Afghanistan continue to provide support for TCCC, 
while its interventions remain disputed in the civilian sector.6 
A research paper endorsed by NTOA, The Relevance of Tactical Combat 
Casualty Care (TCCC) Guidelines to Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, argues that 
TCCC training is necessary for SWAT team members because the officers’ missions put 
them into scenarios in which standard EMS training is insufficient. The paper supports 
TCCC’s basic approach to tactical medicine by stressing that casualties should first 
remain in the fight after being injured; it explains that, contrary to the many stereotypes 
surrounding gunshot wounds, most non-lethal injuries sustained during active operations 
do no debilitate the operator. The writers, like military medical experts, believe that 
medical training instructors teaching tactical medicine should avoid running training 
scenarios in which student operators incur incapacitating injuries, because such scenarios 
will create training scars. They warn that officers who practice playing dead after 
simulating being shot during training will likely abandon the mission after being shot in 
an actual scenario.7   
                                                
6 Frank K. Butler, et al., Tactical Management of Urban Warfare Casualties in Special Operations, 
Military Medicine, 165, Suppl. 1, (2000): 1-48, 
http://www.valorproject.org/uploads/Tact_Mgmt_Urban_Warfare.pdf; Lowell W. Chambers, MD, et al., 
Initial Experience of U.S. Marine Corps Forward Resuscitative Surgical System During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Archives of Surgery, Vol. 140, (January 2005): 26-32, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA480500; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidelines for Field Triage 
of Injured Patients: Recommendations of the National Expert Panel on Field Triage, 2011; CAPT Frank K. 
Butler, Jr., MC USN (Ret.), et al., Tactical Combat Casualty Care 2007: Evolving Concepts and Battlefield 
Experience, Military Medicine, Vol. 172, no. 11, (2007): 1-19, 
http://valorproject.org/uploads/butler_military_medicine_tccc_2007.pdf; Robert L. Mabry, MD, et al., 
United States Army Rangers in Somalia: An Analysis of Combat Casualties on an Urban Battlefield, The 
Journal of Trauma, Injury Infection, and Critical Care, Vol. 49, no. 3, (2000): 515-29, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a480509.pdf; Frank K. Butler, Jr., MC, USN Lieutenant Colonel 
John Haymann, MC, and USA Ensign E. George Butler, MC, USN, Tactical Combat Casualty Care in 
Special Operations, Military Medicine, 161, Suppl. 3, (1996): 2-16, 
http://valorproject.org/uploads/TCCC_Special_Operations.pdf. 
7 Kevin Gerold, DO, JD, Capt. Mark Gibbons, EMT-P, and Sean Mckay, EMT-P, The Relevance of 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Guidelines to Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 
http://ntoa.org/site/images/stories/tccc_guidelines_ntoa.pdf. 
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The advice to avoid potentially harmful training scenarios is also supported by 
other authors who write about operating in tactical scenarios. Body response to an 
exciting event, such as being shot during an arrest, is covered in detail in Lieutenant 
Colonel Dave Grossman’s book, On Combat, The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly 
Conflict in War and in Peace. In times of stress, people lose fine motor skills and resort 
back to rehearsed training; therefore, a way to deal with this should be established in any 
law enforcement training process. Instead, according to Tactical Medicine—Competency 
Based Guidelines, a paper written by a team of doctors dedicated to the development of 
standard police officer tactical medical training, many TEMS courses that exist today are 
based on a process-oriented training model that, for instance, assign credit for attending a 
lecture on hemorrhage control, as opposed to participating in hands-on training. The 
authors of the competency based guidelines paper explain that this type of unrealistic, 
process-oriented training does not prepare law enforcement officers for the emergency 
medical scenarios they will encounter in the field.8 
The Institute of Medicine’s report, Emergency Medical Services At the 
Crossroads, explains that America’s disparate EMS agencies are not governed by 
standard training and, furthermore, EMS procedures are not necessarily based on 
evidence of proven results in field trials. This impedes efforts to establish universal police 
officer tactical medicine training protocols, because local police department medical 
training is often founded on each state’s EMS standards. The dependent relationship 
between EMS and law enforcement medicine means that police officer medical training 
also varies widely.9   
At least one state, California, has recently established laws in an attempt to 
mandate TEMS exposure to its SWAT teams. California’s emergency medical services 
                                                
8 Richard B. Schwartz, MD, et al., Tactical Medicine—Competency-Based Guidelines, Prehospital 
Emergency Care, (2011): 1-15, http://www.coalitiontacticalmedicine.org/wp-
content/uploads/TEMS%20Competency%20Paper%20published.pdf; Dave Grossman & Loren W. 
Christensen, On Combat, The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace, PPCT 
Research Publications, 2nd Edition, 16 August 2007.  
9 California POST and EMSA, Tactical Medicine: Operational Programs and Standardized Training 
Recommendations, POST 2009 EXE-0309; Institute of Medicine Committee on the Future of Emergency 
Care in the United States Health System, Emergency Medical Services: At the Crossroads (Future of 
Emergency Care), Institute of Medicine, 2006. 
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authority teamed up with its Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training to 
develop a standard TEMS curriculum for its 58 counties, but TEMS training is more of a 
concept than a set of nationally agreed upon procedures. Unlike TCCC, TEMS has no 
guidelines and no national certificate. Having no certification program presents a 
problem; the fact that officers are provided TEMS training by a jurisdiction in California 
does not mean that their training will be recognized, compatible, or otherwise have 
meaning among other departments across the United States.10  
A critique of TEMS training is presented in, Effectiveness of Tactical Emergency 
Medical Support: A Systematic Review. To examine the effectiveness of tactical 
emergency medicine, the authors of the critique conduct a search of Medline and 
HealthStar databases from 1966 to 2005 and the EMBASE database from 1980 to 2005 
for articles that discussed police officer tactical medicine. They also use a hand search of 
The Tactical Edge, the official publication of the National Tactical Officers Association, 
for the years 1989 to 2005 to find articles pertaining to TEMS. Their primary critique 
throughout the paper in regards to the different TEMS programs that exist is that little 
evidence verifies that TEMS training is successful; however, since typical EMS training 
does not address the requirements of law enforcement, the authors still support tactical 
medical training for police. After noting wide variability in TEMS training, 
implementation, and outcomes, the authors conclude: “Until further research into the 
value of civilian TEMS is available, tactical emergency medical support modeled on the 
military system should comprise part of every civilian tactical law enforcement unit.”11  
Not all literature supports TCCC training as the foundation for civilian law 
enforcement tactical medicine. Matthew Sztajnkrycer’s study, Tactical Medical 
Requirements for Law Enforcement Officers: A Ten Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty 
Deaths, argues that TCCC’s use for police officers could have only limited value. 
                                                
10 California POST and EMSA, Tactical Medicine: Operational Programs and Standardized Training 
Recommendations, POST 2009 EXE-0309. 
11 Michael J. Feldman, MD, PhD, FRCPC, Brian Schwartz, MD, CCFP-EM, and Laurie J. Morrison, 




According to this evaluation of open-source Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data 
 
from 1998–2007, more research should be done to understand how police officers are 
injured when investigating the application of military tactical medical training for civilian 
law enforcement.12   
Sztajnkrycer’s study reveals that, of the 341 officer deaths included in the study, 
123 officers had injuries that could have potentially been remedied with TCCC. This 
number does represent a significant percentage; however, of the 123 deaths, only two 
occurred from isolated extremity hemorrhage that potentially could have been prevented 
with a tourniquet. This characterizes 1.6 percent of the injured officers in the study who 
had potentially preventable causes of death, and it differs widely from the same statistic 
in military deaths. Compared to the number of soldiers with potentially preventable 
causes of death who died from extremity exsanguination in the 1996 TCCC study, which 
was 60 percent, many fewer officers are dying from the same cause. This finding is 
important, because a tourniquet is a leading intervention endorsed by military medicine.13 
Of the line-of-duty deaths discussed in the Sztajnkrycer study, 129 of the victim 
officers sustained trauma to the chest, but their specific causes of death are unknown. If 
they were shot through the heart and died instantly, TCCC interventions would not have 
been helpful. Conversely, if they were shot through a lung and died later of complications 
surrounding a tension pneumothorax, TCCC interventions could have saved their life. 
The number of preventable injuries found in the study can, therefore, only be estimated 
due to the incomplete forensic data that is available. Although this study is limited by 
deficient medical data, it is still worthwhile because it uses causes of police officer deaths 
to determine TCCC’s validity among the law enforcement communities. By expanding 
                                                
12 Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer, MD, PhD, FACEP, Tactical Medical Skill Requirements for Law 
Enforcement Officers: A 10-Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty Deaths, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 
25, no. 4, (2010): 346-52, 
http://www.medicalsci.eu/files/tccc_sztajnkrycer_tccc_in_tems_prehosp_dis_med_2010.pdf. 
13 Department of Defense, Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010; Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer, MD, PhD, FACEP, Tactical Medical Skill 
Requirements for Law Enforcement Officers: A 10-Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty Deaths, Prehospital and 





the study using the most recent data available, the follow-on evaluation in this thesis 
helps determine which training elements of TCCC are more beneficial to police 
officers.14  
The literature that investigates TCCC’s applicability for police departments is 
sparse and insufficient. Some writers argue that the military’s TCCC training should play 
a major role in influencing police officer tactical medical training, because soldiers and 
police officers can be in comparably dangerous situations;15 however, others point out 
that different types of injuries sustained by each population show that more research 
should be done to determine the usefulness of TCCC interventions.16  Those that support 
teaching TCCC interventions to police officers, despite their history of sustaining 
different causes of death, do not necessarily agree on which officers need the training. 17  
NTOA is a prominent advocate for TEMS training for all special weapons and tactics 
(SWAT) teams and argues that TCCC should serve as a foundation for TEMS protocols, 
                                                
14 Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer, MD, PhD, FACEP, Tactical Medical Skill Requirements for Law 
Enforcement Officers: A 10-Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty Deaths, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 
25, no. 4, 2010. 
15 Kevin Gerold, DO, JD, Capt. Mark Gibbons, EMT-P, and Sean Mckay, EMT-P, The Relevance of 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Guidelines to Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 
http://ntoa.org/site/images/stories/tccc_guidelines_ntoa.pdf. 
16 Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer, MD, PhD, FACEP, Tactical Medical Skill Requirements for Law 
Enforcement Officers: A 10-Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty Deaths, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 
25, no. 4, 2010. 
17 California POST and EMSA, Tactical Medicine: Operational Programs and Standardized Training 
Recommendations, POST 2009 EXE-0309; Michael J. Feldman, MD, PhD, FRCPC, Brian Schwartz, MD, 





but not until recently have its members begun to investigate the training’s potential use 
for patrol officers.18   
Although many law enforcement experts have recognized the benefits of TCCC 
training, it is still most widely adopted by SWAT and other tactical teams. The possible 
benefit of its implementation among other departments, such as highway, wilderness, and 
individual rural and urban patrol officers, is relatively unexplored by the literature. This 
represents a gap in the standardization process. Advocacy for tactical police officer 
medicine, beyond standard civilian EMS training, combined with a relative absence of 
unified acceptance of standard protocols, highlights a need for increased research into the 
field of police medicine. 
D. A RECENT PUBLICATION  
Just before this thesis was completed, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) published a series of Training Keys to guide how police officers across the 
nation develop and administer tactical medical training. The new set of instruction 
published by IACP is a step forward in police officer tactical medical instruction. IACP is 
an organization that serves as the professional voice for law enforcement and is 
composed of over 20,000 law enforcement professionals from over 100 countries.19  Like 
the military’s combat medical training, the Training Keys developed by IACP 
occasionally conflict with conventional civilian emergency medical training procedures. 
The keys are designed to help instruct law enforcement officers who arrive first on a 
scene and need to balance tactical and medical issues. The Training Keys were 
developed, in part, because law enforcement officers frequently arrive on the scene of 
injured officers before other emergency responders; IACP acknowledges in its 
publication that police officers’ interventions in tactical scenarios can be lifesaving.20 
                                                
18 Kevin Gerold, DO, JD, Capt. Mark Gibbons, EMT-P, and Sean Mckay, EMT-P, The Relevance of 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Guidelines to Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 
http://ntoa.org/site/images/stories/tccc_guidelines_ntoa.pdf; David Rathbun & Kevin Gerold, “Council 
Works on Establishing a National TEMS Curriculum,” The Tactical Edge, (Summer 2012): 86-95, 
http://www.ntoa.org/massemail/SU12Rathbun.pdf. 
19 International Association of Chiefs of Police, http://www.theiacp.org/. 
20 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key #667, 2012. 
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The IACP Training Keys are useful for not only underlining the importance of 
teaching police officers tactical medicine but also for showing the differences between 
U.S. soldiers’ and U.S. police officers’ professional duties and medical training 
requirements. The Training Keys, for instance, emphasize the value of teaching police 
officers how to use an automated external defibrillator (AED) on victims who are 
suffering from cardiac arrest. According to the IACP publication, studies show that AED 
“use by law enforcement is associated with a doubling of survival rates in shockable 
cardiac arrests that occur outside of a hospital.”21  Similar AED statistics are not included 
in military tactical medical training documents, because the military and police have 
different overall missions. Most military tactical medicine is designed primarily to treat 
members of the U.S. or its allied armed forces. Although medical procedures can, and 
are, used also to treat enemy combatants, the basic procedures are designed to care for 
friendly military combatants, who sustain battle wounds, not non-combatants suffering 
from non-tactical wounds like cardiac arrests.22 
After mentioning the positive influence that police officers can have in their 
community by acting as medical first responders, the Training Keys move forward to 
examine police officer roles in providing care to themselves and their colleagues in 
tactical scenarios.  “Law enforcement officers,” according to the publication, “may find 
themselves providing care to colleagues, either during periods of active threat when 
conventional EMS cannot enter the scene due to safety concerns or prior to the arrival of 
EMS.”23  It explains that once a scene is safe, EMS providers will take the leading role in 
caring for casualties. Until the scene is safe, however, officers need to understand the 
basics of tactical medicine.24 
The Training Keys suggest three stages for medical care in a tactical environment: 
Care Under Threat, Tactical Field Care, and Casualty Evacuation. The titles of these three 
phases are nearly identical to those phases advocated by TCCC; only minor wording 






differences distinguish the headings in the two bodies of instruction. Much of the specific 
medical procedures explained in the Training Keys are also similar to TCCC procedures. 
Relationships between the Training Keys and Tactical Combat Casualty Care are 
discussed in detail in chapter three. Some problems still exist in the Training Keys’ 
direction. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, glitches in the Training Keys are 
examined and suggestions are made for their improvement.25 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines a number of the law enforcement agencies that operate in 
California to determine whether standard military medical training procedures would 
benefit different police departments across the state; and if so, which procedures could be 
useful for which agencies. California is a useful model, because its state and local 
agencies account for almost 10 percent of America’s total number of state and local law 
enforcement agencies. Additionally, California encompasses several types of departments 
including local, state, tribal, wilderness, highway, and federal police agencies. These 
departments are studied to measure two variables: EMS response times and average 
patrol size (one or more police officers).   
To establish whether a military supported medical procedure is applicable to the 
civilian police officer context, this study uses the police officers’ work environment, 
common causes of death, and overall mission as determining factors. Determining 
mechanisms of law enforcement injury (how officers are injured) and comparing it to 
military injuries is useful because it provides a comparative analysis of how each are 
dying as well as reveals police officer vulnerabilities and strengths. Typical EMS 
response time is also studied to compare the difference between law enforcement and 
military assets, and because response time was a deciding factor in the incentive to 
develop military-specific medicine. An assessment of multiple jurisdictions’ EMS 
response time and unit size is compared to common mechanisms of law enforcement 
officer injury and the role of various TCCC interventions. This comparison is beneficial 
                                                
25 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key #667, 2012; Department of Defense, 
Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010. 
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for supporting attempts to establish a more standard national police officer tactical 
medicine curriculum.   
Individual units were researched by direct contact and through information 
available online to determine their unit patrol size and working conditions. Response 
times were mapped by working with American Medical Response (the nation’s leading 
medical transportation provider) and local dispatch agencies to determine the 
approximate EMS response time each department can expect on an average day; longer 
EMS response and transfer times impact the type of medical training that is relevant to 
individual departments.  
Additionally, this thesis builds on the Sztajnkrycer study, Tactical Medical Skill 
Requirements for Law Enforcement Officers: A 10-Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty Deaths, 
to determine if there have been any documented evolutions in police officer mechanisms 
of injury since the study was published. To continue Sztajnkrycer’s study, this thesis uses 
the same FBI resource that the original author used for open source data on police officer 
deaths. The revised analysis revealed only minor changes. Using response times and 
patrol size data for individual units, combined with data concerning common modes of 
injury that tactical preventative medicine can cure, this study provides insight into the 
TCCC procedures and other tactical medical techniques that can best benefit various 
agencies throughout California. With California as a model, it serves as a demonstration 
of how tactical medicine can be developed in multiple jurisdictions in other states across 
the nation.  
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
This introductory chapter discussed the importance of the research and expressed 
the need for a more standard tactical medical training program for police officers. It then 
covered the existing literature on the subject in terms of its significance to the thesis and 
concluded by explaining areas of the existing literature that are lacking and how they can 
be improved. The second chapter examines multiple law enforcement agencies in 
California to determine how their operational environments compare to military 
operational environments. It studies the officers’ work settings and their predicted 
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response times. The third chapter focuses on TCCC training and common law 
enforcement causes of death. Sztajnkrycer’s law enforcement line-of-duty death study is 
expanded to review potential developments in law enforcement causes of death. Chapter 
three also provides a clear understanding of why TCCC was created by members of the 
military. It discusses the basic design elements of the TCCC procedures that have made it 
a useful training option for soldiers to emphasize useful concepts that can be embraced by 
the law enforcement community. The fourth, and final, chapter analyzes the findings 
expressed in the previous chapters in terms of specific TCCC procedures. It provides 
suggestions for the nation’s local, state, tribal, wilderness, highway and federal law 
enforcement community, policy makers, and EMS professionals on how to improve 
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II. CHALLENGES OF WORK ENVIRONMENT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the work environment of the law enforcement agencies 
that operate in California. Like the pioneering study that was sponsored by the U.S. 
Special Operations Command in 1996, Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special 
Operations, this chapter is concerned with the influence of the operators’—in this case 
the police officers’—operational environment. The operational environment of a military 
combatant as well as a police officer is controlled and restrained by a number of factors. 
Three of the influential factors that determine the type and extent of medical knowledge 
required by the operator are: team size, access to various stages of medical reinforcement, 
and limits imposed by a tactical situation. Each of these three factors is discussed below 
as it pertains to local, state, federal, tribal, and wilderness police departments in 
California. Like Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special Operations, this study 
provides representative casualty scenarios that could be encountered by the operators.   
The TCCC in Special Operations study offers four casualty scenarios to frame the 
context of medical care situations that soldiers can encounter. Two of those four are 
summarized here. The first scenario involves a ship attack operation carried out by Navy 
SEALs. The SEALs launch their attack from a large coastal patrol craft and conduct a 
one-hour transit on smaller rubber crafts before dismounting. Finally, they swim one-half 
mile and finish their approach to the target using closed-circuit diving equipment.26  
Once on target, a member of the team sustains a gunshot wound to the chest. A second 
scenario involves a twelve-man Army Special Forces team that performs a night 
interdiction operation on a weapons convoy. The team members perform a night 
parachute jump from a C-130 aircraft, followed by a four-mile hike over rocky terrain to 
reach their objective. The planned extraction is to be conducted by a helicopter near the 
target. While landing, one of the team members fractures his left fibula. The two other 
                                                
26 Closed-circuit diving equipment involves a breathing loop that scrubs the SEALs’ exhaled air and 
allows them to rebreathe it, which prevents bubbles from coming to the surface that could otherwise alert 
the target of their presence. 
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scenarios about special operators follow this same framework; they explain medical 
situations that occur in austere environments to show a need for tactical medical training. 
Although police officers might not be put in situations as extreme as the two 
military examples, the police officers’ tactical situations do require unique medical 
training that other civilian emergency medical responders might not need or train for. To 
highlight the need for tactical medical training for police officers, this chapter presents 
four law enforcement tactical medical situations, which are based on actual scenarios 
encountered by officers since 2008. The chapter presents the casualty scenarios on an 
individual basis following related sections; for instance, the description of a local police 
officer injury follows the section on state and local law enforcement. The same pattern of 
presenting casualty scenarios with their respective section is used throughout and occurs 
in the sections concerning wilderness police, federal law enforcement, and response 
times. These casualty scenarios are not meant to serve as all-inclusive representations of 
their respective sections but rather to offer examples of potential scenarios the various 
agencies can be faced with.   
B. STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
State and local law enforcement agencies employ the largest majority of the 
nation’s sworn police officers (those officers with general arrest powers). Today there are 
more than 900,000 sworn officers operating in the United States.27  Local police 
departments in particular employ 60 percent of all sworn officers. Local sheriffs are the 
second largest employers of sworn officers, with 24 percent of the sworn officer 
population.28  The latest available Department of Justice census, which was printed in 
2011, reported a total of 17,985 state and local agencies in the United States. Almost half 
of these departments are fairly small in terms personnel; 49 percent of all state and local 
law enforcement agencies employ fewer than ten full-time officers. Due to the prevalence 
                                                
27 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, Facts & Figures, 
http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/; Brian A. Reaves, PhD, Census of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. Department of Justice, July 2011. 
28 Brian A. Reaves, PhD, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. 
Department of Justice, July 2011. 
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of local departments with ten or less full-time officers, and because police officers in 
small towns—like those working in large cities—must be prepared for tactical medical 
situations, this research covers departments of all size.29 
California, with 84,798 sworn officers, employs an unequal share of the nation’s 
police officers.30  There are over 550 separate state and local law enforcement agencies 
that operate in California. The size of these departments varies extensively. The Sutter 
Creek Police Department, in Amador County 40 miles east of Sacramento, has only five 
full-time police officers. In contrast to these smaller departments, the Los Angeles Police 
Department has the third largest police department in the United States with a total of 
9,727 full-time sworn personnel. Working parallel to and sometimes alongside the Los 
Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department employs 9,461 full-
time personnel, making it the largest sheriff’s office, by number of officers, in the United 
States.31 
In terms of numbers, most police departments are situated somewhere in between 
the extreme examples of Los Angeles and Sutter Creek. The city of Morro Bay police 
department is useful for this study because, like many small to mid-sized departments, its 
officers take on multiple roles. Morro Bay employs around twenty full-time sworn 
officers. The police department is made up of a police chief, a commander, four 
sergeants, two corporals, nine officers (including two senior officers), and one part time 
officer, as well as various support services personnel and dispatchers. Despite having a 
small number of police officers, the department provides law enforcement services 
nonstop, 24 hours a day, seven days a week to the city. The city of Morro Bay is centrally 
located on the coastal boundary of San Luis Obispo County. It has a mixed population of 
10,300 and covers a total land area of approximately ten square miles or 6,500 acres. Its 
 
 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 California POST, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training; Current Employed Full-
Time Sworn, Reserve & Dispatcher Personnel, 29 June 2012. 
31 Brian A. Reaves, PhD, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. 
Department of Justice, July 2011. 
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geographic size and number of inhabitants force the police department to strategically 
manage its personnel in order to maintain stability and provide continuous law 
enforcement duties year-round.32 
To manage law enforcement activities that will sufficiently cover Morro Bay’s 
population and size while maximizing patrol staffing during each shift, the police 
department has its officers patrol for 12-hour shifts, three days a week. Lone patrol 
officers handle all field calls during their shifts. Patrol officers are trained to deal with all 
types of criminals; they perform traffic stops day and night, handle disturbances, and 
make multiple arrests. Patrolling without a partner in their car, these officers must be 
trained to handle medical emergencies without immediate assistance from their 
colleagues. If injured on the job, patrol officers can only rely on the medical equipment 
that is carried on their person or in their squad car. For any emergency that requires 
outside support, a patrol officer needs to radio for help and wait for some form of medical 
backup.33 
In addition to their patrol operations, some Morro Bay Police Officers are part of 
the San Luis Obispo Regional SWAT Team. Regional SWAT Teams—also called multi-
jurisdictional SWAT teams—are common across the United States. They allow agencies 
that are limited by size and capability to combine resources and deploy on tactical 
missions in their region.34  SWAT team personnel have clear tactical advantages over 
single patrol officers. If a single patrol officer answers a call that leads to a combative, 
tactical situation, that officer is forced to handle the incident alone. In contrast, members 
of a SWAT team can rely on their teammates for additional medical support when in 
tactical situations.35   
                                                
32 The City of Morro Bay, http://www.morro-bay.ca.us/.  
33 Ibid.   
34 National Tactical Officers Association, SWAT Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies, 2011. 
35 Richard Hannabal, Partners in Safety; Morro Bay Peace Officer’s Association Community 
Newsletter, Ed. 48, July 2012. 
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The San Luis Obispo Regional SWAT Team is composed of officers from several 
of the county’s police departments and deploys to missions across the county.36  Like 
other states, California has multiple regional SWAT teams. Regional SWAT teams often 
consist of officers who have other full-time duties at their local department. These 
regional teams are built in sparse districts and parts of the state with police departments 
that cannot support a full-time SWAT team and instead rely on the support of outside 
resources. Departments from these regions, which have a limited number of personnel but 
still desire the SWAT capability, enter into agreements with other departments in their 
region that have similar means.   
California’s regional SWAT teams are used to plan and execute arrests of groups 
as well as single individuals that law enforcement officials think will resist arrest or 
otherwise present a danger to the arresting officers. Although all police officers have the 
potential to be injured on the job, the criminals targeted by SWAT teams present, at least 
presumably, an amplified danger, which is why the SWAT team is called into 
operation.37  The San Luis Obispo Regional SWAT Team is trained specifically to 
respond to the city of Morro Bay and other local communities when a dangerous situation 
takes place that requires a skilled tactical team.38  Working in teams is advantageous in 
regards to tactical medicine; however, in less populated and rural areas of California, 
where regional SWAT teams are common due to limited resources, EMS response time is 
not required by code to be as expedient, which presents an amplified risk.39  
Other local agencies, such as the Los Angeles Police Department, are large 
enough to have SWAT teams comprised exclusively of the department’s own full-time 
                                                
36 According to the Arroyo Grande Police Departments, members of the San Luis Obispo Regional 
SWAT Team include: Morro Bay, Arroyo Grande, San Luis Obispo, Pismo Beach, Grover Beach, Paso 
Robles, and the Polytechnic University San Luis Obispo Police Departments. 
37 According to the National Tactical Officers Association’s guiding publication, SWAT Standard: 
“the primary characteristic of SWAT that distinguishes it from other units is the focus of effort. SWAT 
teams are focused on tactical solutions, as opposed to other functions, such as investigation. The purpose of 
SWAT is to increase the likelihood of safety resolving critical incidents . . . such as hostage situations, 
barricade incidents or other high-risk situations requiring specialized capability.” 
38 Richard Hannabal, Partners in Safety; Morro Bay Peace Officer’s Association Community 
Newsletter, Ed. 48, July 2012. 
39 The California Association of Tactical Officers, http://www.catonews.org/; California Health and 
Safety Code, Division 2.5, 1797.200. 
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officers who focus specially on SWAT.40  The Los Angeles Police Department was the 
first police department in the United States to implement the concept of a SWAT team; it 
conceived of the idea for special weapons and tactics teams in the mid-1960s.41  Today it 
is one of the few departments in the state to have a SWAT team composed of members 
who have no other collateral duties. Like regional SWAT teams, the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s SWAT team is called into action primarily in tactical situations such as 
when presented with a suspect that is excessively dangerous and refuses to submit to 
arrest.42   
Many customary, everyday police operations do not require the assistance of a 
SWAT team or any other specialized team. Despite having 250 different job 
opportunities—including SWAT, helicopter pilots, fixed-wing pilots, and K-9 units—the 
Los Angeles Police Department claims that patrol is the backbone of its department. All 
officers at the Los Angeles Police Department begin by working patrol. The reason patrol 
is considered the backbone, is that patrol officers are the department’s primary provider 
of policing services to the community. This is the same for local police departments 
across the state. One job that is available at almost every local police department is that 
of the lone patrol officer. Patrol officers deal with subjects and make arrest often without 
the assistance of a partner. Working alone to handle and control enemy combatants 
occurs much less frequently among members of the military, including those in the 
special operations community. On the rare occasion that a soldier is forced to deal with 
enemy combatants without assistance or backup from a teammate, it is generally 
unplanned and occurs usually only after parts of the mission have gone wrong. Police 
officers who work alone require an altered type of medical training with only a few 
TCCC procedures.   
                                                
40 The City of San Jose, Police Department Staffing: Opportunities to Maximize the Number of Police 
Officers on Patrol, Office of the Auditor, Report 10–13, December 2010. 
41 The California Association of Tactical Officers, http://www.catonews.org/.   
42 For instance, the Los Angeles Police Department’s official website says that its SWAT team is 
activated when, “faced with a barricaded or hostage incident when the subject is probably armed; the 
suspect is believed to have been involved in a criminal act or is a significant threat to the lives and safety of 
the public and/or police; the suspect is in a position of advantage, affording cover and concealment or is 
contained in an open area and the presence or approach of police officers could precipitate an adverse 
reaction by the suspect; and, the suspect refuses to submit to arrest.” 
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1. Casualty Scenario 1, Local Officer, 2010 
An example of the work environment and limited immediate medical assets that 
local law enforcement officers are regularly challenged with is presented in this first 
scenario, which occurred in Albany, Georgia in 2010. Just before 10 p.m., a 39-year-old 
lieutenant working in the city was killed while responding to a robbery call. Although 
other patrolmen had been called to the general area to find the suspect, the lieutenant was 
patrolling alone. When the lieutenant saw the suspect running through a dimly lit mobile 
home park near the incident of the crime, he exited his patrol car and began a foot 
pursuit. At some point during the chase, the suspect fired two rounds from a 9-millimeter 
semiautomatic pistol. One round hit the lieutenant in his upper thigh and exited through 
his lower back. Another round, the fatal one, entered just below the lieutenant’s ballistic 
vest on the right side of his abdomen and exited through his lower back. Sometime in the 
process, the lieutenant fired two shots, but neither hit the suspect. Environment and 
Assets: the officer was working at night in an urban setting with generally rapid EMS 
response time. He was alone with no other officers to immediately assist in his 
emergency/ tactical medical care.43  
C. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 
The California Highway Patrol is the largest state law enforcement agency in the 
country, with 7,417 full-time sworn officers.44  These officers are spread across 11 
operational divisions: the agency’s eight Field Divisions, the Office of Air Operations, 
the State Security Division, and the Protective Services Division. The state is divided into 
eight sections by its respective Field Divisions, which employ the majority of the 
                                                
43 Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2010, Uniform Crime Report, October 2011. 
44 Brian A. Reaves, PhD, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. 
Department of Justice, July 2011; California POST, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training; 
Current Employed Full-Time Sworn, Reserve & Dispatcher Personnel, 29 June 2012. 
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agency’s law enforcement officers.45  The divisions are further broken into area offices 
that represent local regions. Officers who work from a division office generally patrol 
alone to cover long stretches of the state’s highways. No other state law enforcement 
agency covers a greater jurisdiction than the Highway Patrol. California Highway Patrol 
Officers have the opportunity to work in almost every region of every county throughout 
the state. Their job is inherently dangerous because not only do they deal with subjects 
without a partner, but also they are forced to approach vehicles on the side of highways 
day and night with traffic traveling by at speeds in excess of 65 miles per hour. 
A Los Angeles Times article published in 2010, “CHP Death Toll a Grim 
Reminder of the Job’s Dangers,” illustrates some of the hazards associated with working 
as a highway patrol officer, not only in the state of California but also across the nation. 
According to the editorial, new safety laws, such as the 2007 “move over” law, which 
requires motorists to shift to the empty lane opposite of the stopped highway patrol car, 
are not doing enough to protect the lives of these officers. California Highway Patrol 
statistics confirm that between two and four officers are killed in the line of duty each 
year. The article was published after five California Highway Patrolmen were killed in 
six weeks in May and June of 2010. Officers working for the highway patrol are trained 
to avoid dangerous situations whenever possible, but standing on the side of a highway in 
close proximity to fast-moving vehicles without a protective guard rail or a partner to 
stand watch and/or give buddy aid in the case of an injury is inherently dangerous. After 
being seriously injured, highway patrol officers without backup are forced to apply self-
aid and wait for reinforcement.46 
                                                
45 According to the California Highway Patrol, http://www.chp.ca.gov/, the Southern Division has 10 
area offices and 1,123 uniformed officers; the Border Division has 12 area offices and 900 uniform 
officers; the Inland Division has 11 area offices and 602 uniformed officers; the Coastal Division has 11 
area offices and 530 uniformed officers; the Central Division has 15 area offices and 667 uniformed 
officers; the Golden Gate Division has 12 area offices and 1,043 uniformed officers; the Valley Division 
has 17 area offices and 785 uniformed officers; and the Northern Division has 15 area offices and 542 
uniformed officers. 
46 Sam Allen & Richard Winton, “CHP Death Toll a Grim Reminder of Job’s Dangers,” Los Angeles 
Times, 29 June 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/29/local/la-me-chp-20100629.  
 25 
D. TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280, which granted California and five 
other states—Alaska, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin—state authority over 
“Indian Country.”47  These states are now commonly referred to as 280 states. Until this 
law was passed, tribal lands were under the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement. The 
new statute mandated shifting federal authority over criminal offences that are committed 
in Indian Country to the 280 states. When this shift occurred, federal money was not 
allocated to the 280 states to support the modification; instead, the states’ budgets 
shouldered the burden. Rural sheriff’s offices that were already stressed for resources 
were required to patrol and enforce state laws on the vast Indian reservations. Recently 
Indian tribes in California have begun to reassert local law enforcement within their 
communities. State and local officials partially embrace this move by the tribes, as it 
reduces the workload of local sheriffs and frees up the sheriffs’ resources. Still, 
inadequate funding for the police departments on Indian reservations persists throughout 
California.48 
Lack of funding for tribal law enforcement in California presents an immediate 
safety issue for the police officers working in Indian Territory. The Los Coyotes Police 
Department in San Diego County has jurisdiction over 25,000 acres of Indian Land, the 
largest Indian Reservation in the county.49  As recently as 2010 the department did not 
                                                
47 Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Public Law 280 and Law Enforcement in Indian 
Country—Research Priorities, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of 
Justice, December 2005. In this report, Indian Country is defined as “all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and including the rights-of-way through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the titles to which 
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
48 Dave Sossaman, Chief of Police, “Deputy Special Officer U.S. DOI Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Authority,” Los Coyotes Police Department, BIA SLEC, 
http://catpca.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/ICLESAPL280.pdf; Chief of Police Dave Sossman, 
“Los Coyotes Police Department, A Federally Deputized Police Agency,” to Bob Chaney U.S. Department 
of Justice, 26 August 2010, http://catpca.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/WPTPDI.pdf; Carole 
Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Public Law 280 and Law Enforcement in Indian Country—
Research Priorities, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 
December 2005.  
49 Tribal Police law enforcement is relatively new. The Los Coyotes Police Department became the 
second federally recognized and deputized Tribal Police Agency in San Diego County in 2006. 
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have adequate funding to provide 24-hour dispatchers; its sole police officer, Police Chief 
David Sossaman, is responsible for patrolling a 40 square-mile area without a single 
partner to act as a backup in emergency situations. Police officers who work without 24-
hour dispatch are forced to respond to calls and approach vehicles or residences without 
warning of the perpetrators’ history. Due to lack of funding, California’s tribal police 
officers are among the most poorly equipped police officers in the state in terms of 
medical assets and access to secondary medical care.50   
E. WILDERNESS POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
Wilderness police departments in California operate at both the state and federal 
level. The California Department of Fish and Game is an example of a state-level 
wilderness police department. The department has 348 full-time sworn conservation 
officers, commonly called game wardens, employed throughout the state. Although their 
primary job is to enforce Fish and Game code, the wardens have the authority to enforce 
any of California’s state or local laws. Game wardens are required to carry firearms as 
they patrol California’s backcountry to enforce laws at the many lakes, rivers, beaches, 
wetlands, and desert locations across the state. The game wardens’ unique operational 
environment demands that they carry out arrests day and night from unconventional 
platforms, such as jet skis, boats, airplanes, horseback, canoes, and all-terrain vehicles. 
The duty to enforce hunting laws can put wardens at an exceptional risk, because 
suspects in hunting situations are often carrying some sort of weapon. Like many officers 
in this study, Fish and Game officers work alone. They often patrol with minimal backup 
and in remote parts of the state where emergency medical services’ response times are 
not required to be as prompt as they are in urban environments.51  
                                                
50 Edward Sifuentes, “Region: Tiny Tribal Police Department Tackles Big Obstacles, Police Chief on 
Los Coyotes Helps Quell Crime,” North County Times, 05 September 2010, 
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/region-tiny-tribal-police-department-tackles-big-
obstacles/article_065e66d8-448a-5e70-9d99-75361f414587.html. 
51 California POST, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training: Current Employed Full-
Time Sworn, Reserve & Dispatcher Personnel, 29 June 2012; California Department of Fish and Game, 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/. 
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An example of federal-level wilderness police officers working in California is 
that of officers working for the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Forest Service has 130 officers in California, divided between federal 
investigators and wilderness patrol officers. These officers enforce federal laws across 
California’s 25 million acres of National Forest land. Like the game wardens working for 
the Department of Fish and Game, Forest Service officers sometimes patrol by 
horseback, all-terrain vehicles, watercraft, and foot while enforcing the law. Forest 
Service officers assist the California Department of Fish and Game in the enforcement of 
wildlife laws but also have special jurisdiction over federal statutes.   
The objectives of the Forest Service officers vary. They are tasked with protecting 
the public, Forest Service employees, and the natural resources and property under the 
jurisdiction of the Forest Service. To do this, the officers investigate and enforce laws 
that affect the national forests and work to prevent criminal violations. Part of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s responsibility is to ensure the safety of the guests visiting 
public lands; this requirement puts the Forest Service officers in contact with members of 
Mexican drug cartels and criminal gangs, because much of the marijuana grown on 
public lands in California is directly related to criminal groups.   
Forest Service officers are severely understaffed. Only eight officers in the state 
are dedicated to drug enforcement on 20 million acres. Therefore, like the other 
wilderness officers discussed herein, Forest Service officers commonly patrol alone in 
remote areas of the state. Denese Stokes and Ken Harp, two Forest Service officers who 
work together to patrol San Bernardino National Forest south of Los Angeles, were 
quoted in a 2010 National Geographic article regarding the limited forces available for 
battling the drug cartels. In reference to the gangs, Harp explained, “one cartel” can have 
up to “60 or 80” individuals.52  Stokes, a special agent for drug investigations in four 
national forests, says Forest Service Officers are, “fighting a huge fight with just a small 
amount of people.”53  This is especially dangerous in remote areas of California with 
                                                
52 “Marijuana War Smolders on U.S. Public Lands,” National Geographic, 28 October 2010. 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/11/1103_031104_marijuana_2.html  
53 Ibid.  
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slow EMS backup and highlights the need for special medical training among Forest 
Service Police Officers. 
1. Casualty Scenario 2, Conservation Officer, 2010 
At 10:30 p.m., a conservation officer was investigating report of illegal poaching 
of deer. Upon hearing gunfire, the 31-year-old officer traveled toward the source of the 
noise, where he found a pickup truck with at least two individuals in it. The officer called 
dispatch with the license plate number and requested backup. Before backup could arrive, 
the driver of the pickup exited his truck and approached the officer. The officer attempted 
to handcuff the man to control the scene, but the suspect resisted. A struggle broke out, 
and the officer and suspect exchanged gunfire. The suspect shot the officer in the back of 
his legs and in the back of his neck with a .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun. The 
passenger later told police that the driver had illegally shot a deer shortly before the 
officer had arrived, and that the driver told the passenger that he was not going back to 
jail. Environment and Assets: the officer was alone and working at night in a rural setting 
with generally slower EMS response time. Officers were dispatched to assist in the arrest 
and could have been the first to aid in his emergency/ tactical medical care.54 
F. OTHER FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 
Multiple federal agencies with law enforcement functions operate in California. 
The state’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training lists 22 separate federal 
agencies that perform some type of law enforcement task within the state’s boundaries.55  
Three agencies that exercise wide-ranging police authority in California are the Federal 
                                                
54 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2010, Uniform Crime Report, October 2011. 
55 According to the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, the following federal 
agencies have law enforcement activities in California: American Correctional Association; Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Central 
Intelligence Agency; Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (U.S. DOJ); Community Oriented Policing 
Services (U.S. DOJ); Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (U.S. DOJ); Drug Enforcement 
Administration; Department of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Federal Government Agency 
Index; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; Department of Homeland Security; Justice Technology 
Information Network; National Criminal Justice Reference Service; National Institute of Justice; National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Presidio of Monterey Police Department; U.S. Attorney Central 
California District; U.S. Attorney Southern California District; U.S. Marshals Service; and the Secret 
Service. 
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).   
Of the duties federal law enforcement agencies perform, this section covering 
federal law enforcement focuses on a relatively new trend emerging in the law 
enforcement community that directly influences the type of medical training that federal 
and state agencies should receive. Unlike many of the law enforcement operations 
studied in this thesis, which involve law enforcement officers working alone, this new 
trend allows agencies across all levels of the government to combine their forces and 
work in teams to conduct investigations and carry out arrests. The operational units that 
emerge from these multi-agency agreements are often referred to as multi-agency task 
forces. 
In past few years, the FBI has made California headlines a number of times for its 
operations that involve multi-agency task forces. For instance, in January 2011, San 
Diego FBI Special Agent in Charge Keith Slotter announced the arrest of a U.S. Border 
Patrol agent who was caught thanks to the work of a multi-agency task force. In the 
statement, Slotter explained that an FBI SWAT Team arrested the Border Patrol agent 
with the assistance of the suspect’s own agency. The arrest was made possible by a joint 
investigation conducted by the agency’s Border Corruption Task Force.56  The Border 
Corruption Task Force is only one of many task forces that are involved in this ongoing 
development in multi-agency cooperation. According to Special Agent Keith Byers from 
the Chicago branch of the FBI, combining multiple agencies into task forces is a trend 
that was initiated in only, “the last 10 years or so.”57  Yet due to the success of multi-
agency task units, the trend has caught on. Today many law enforcement agencies are 
embracing cooperation both horizontally and vertically across all levels of the 
government.   
                                                
56 Darrell Foxworth, Border Corruption Task Force Arrests Border Patrol Agent, FBI San Diego, 11 
January 2011. 
57 See: Combating Border Corruption. Available in the news videos on the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Official website, http://www.fbi.gov/news/videos/combating-border-corruption/.   
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In three consecutive months from August to October of 2012, the FBI conducted 
numerous successful investigations and follow-on arrests using this task force technique. 
Eight people were arrested in August 2012 and indicted on sex trafficking charges for 
allegedly forcing teenage girls into prostitution. Six of the people detained were arrested 
by the Inland Child Exploitation/Prostitution Task Force. The Inland Child 
Exploitation/Prostitution Task Force is comprised of agents, deputies, and officers from 
the FBI and a number of local California law enforcement agencies, such as the Riverside 
County Sheriff’s Department, Riverside Police Department, San Bernardino Police 
Department, Pomona Police Department, and the Ontario Police Department.58   
During the two months following the Inland Child Exploitation/Prostitution Task 
Force’s arrests, September and October of 2012, the Border Corruption Task Force struck 
again, arresting corrupt Border Patrol agents at least twice more.59  Members of the 
Customs and Border Protection were arrested for trafficking illegal aliens into the United 
States. Drug cartels have the resources to bribe U.S. border officials and in doing so gain 
the agents’ loyalty. Corrupt officials then provide intelligence to the cartels, which poses 
a national security threat to America. To combat this, the FBI established the Border 
Corruption Initiative in 2009. Since 2009, the FBI stood up 21 Border Corruption Task 
Forces across the nation in high-risk cities along American land borders. Timothy 
Delaney, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office says that, “in 
recent years, dozens of task forces throughout the United States have charged over 1,000 
defendants.”60   
The U.S. Marshals Service has four Fugitive Task Forces that operate in 
California. These task forces, like the FBI’s task forces, work with authorities at federal, 
state, and local levels of the government. Their primary mission is to apprehend fugitives 
                                                
58 The FBI Central District of California, Los Angeles-Area Gang Members Among Eight Indicted on 
Sex Trafficking Charges for Allegedly Prostituting Teenage Girls, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 09 August 2012. 
59 Darrell Foxworth, Customs and Border Protection Officer Arrested by Border Corruption Task 
Force Agents, FBI San Diego, 10 September 2012; Darrell Foxworth, Chula Vista Woman Arrested in 
Connection with Corruption Investigation, FBI San Diego, 05 October 2012. 
60 The FBI Central District of California, Los Angeles-Area Gang Members Among Eight Indicted on 
Sex Trafficking Charges for Allegedly Prostituting Teenage Girls, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 09 August 2012; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, FY 2012 Authorization and Budget Request to Congress, Department of 
Justice, February 2011. 
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and clear state and local felony warrants. On 31 January 2012, one of the U.S. Marshals 
Fugitive Task Forces operating in California arrested a man wanted for homicide in 
Oakland, CA. The arrest was made possible by combining the forces of the U.S. 
 
Marshals Service, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Fugitive 
Apprehension Team, the Oakland Police Department, and the San Francisco Police 
Department.61 
A recent agreement between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the 
Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office illustrates how these task forces work intimately with 
one another on all aspects of the arrest. In the agreement dated 30 September 2012, the 
Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office contracted two of its experienced officers to the 
DEA’s San Jose Resident Office Task Force, where they are working along side the 
federal agents while pursuing and apprehending criminals. This arrangement was made to 
disrupt the illicit drug traffic in Santa Clara County, gather and report intelligence data 
related to trafficking, and to enable the task force to conduct undercover operations and 
other methods of investigation. In the event that one or both of the officers is unable to 
perform the duties required of the job, the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office agrees to 
find a replacement to ensure continuity of operations. The DEA matched the sheriff’s 
office contribution by assigning three of its special agents to the task force and providing 
funds to support the group’s effort. As federal agencies increasingly work together with 
state and local law enforcement agencies to combat crime, the need for standardized 
medical training increases. Tactical medicine is focused on saving as many lives as 
possible in a combative setting by teaching tactics that are valuable in medical 
emergencies. In order to save more lives, it is necessary that all members of the team to 
be familiar with the training.62 
                                                
61 U.S. Marshals Service, http://www.justice.gov/marshals/, Northern District of California District 
News. 
62 DEA Task Force Agreement with Office of the Sheriff, Program-Funded State and Local Task 
Force Agreement Between the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office and DEA Task Force Group 1 (San 
Jose), 30 September 2012. 
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1. Casualty Scenario 3, Federal Officer, 2008 
At 6 a.m., a FBI agent was attempting to serve an arrest warrant as part of a multi-
agency arrest team. Members of the multi-agency team knocked on the suspect’s front 
door and rang the doorbell. As the suspect approached the front door, officers notified 
him of law enforcement presence and told the suspect that the officers had a warrant for 
his arrest. Instead of opening the door, the suspect ran in the other direction. Officers 
initiated a forced entry using a battering ram to open the door. The FBI agent was the first 
officer to enter the house once the door was forced open. As he entered, the suspect’s 
wife fired a single round from a .38-caliber revolver. The round struck the agent in the 
front upper torso/ chest above his bulletproof vest. Environment and Assets: the officer 
was in an urban setting with generally rapid EMS response time. There were multiple 
officers to assist in his emergency tactical medical care.63 
G. ACCESS TO MEDICAL REINFORCEMENT: CALIFORNIA EMS 
RESPONSE TIME 
Delayed access to definitive medical care in 1993 during the Battle of Mogadishu, 
Somalia, was a determining factor in the military’s decision to revamp its medical 
training. The 15-hour delay in transporting casualties occurred during that battle because 
helicopters could not land amidst hostilities to transport the wounded. Police officers 
seldom face delays of this length. On the contrary, emergency medical response times are 
minimal in comparison in most circumstances throughout the state of California. Still, 
tactical scenarios, mass casualty events, emergency location, and EMS or dispatcher 
mishaps can significantly lengthen the time between the initial emergency call and the 
arrival of the first medical support personnel. 
The state of California authorizes each of its counties to develop individual 
emergency response programs and to designate a local agency to respond to emergency 
                                                
63 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2008, Uniform Crime Report, October 2009. 
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medical calls.64  The Emergency Medical Services Authority explicitly defines the 
minimum response time standards that should be achieved in agreements between 
response agencies and their counties. Response time requirements are determined by the 
location of the emergency: urban, rural, or wilderness setting.65  The response time for 
advanced life support is not to exceed 8 minutes in urban areas, 20 minutes in rural areas, 
or, “as quickly as possible” in wilderness areas of the state. The emergency medical 
services providers in certain counties, however, do not always adhere to time standards.66 
Delayed response times are a frequent problem in rural areas of the state where 
staffing and poorly maintained roads make rapid response difficult. The Sutter Creek 
Police Department mentioned earlier, which is 40 miles east of the state’s capital city and 
employs only five full-time police officers, is located in rural Amador County. In its 2008 
Municipal Services Review, an Amador local commission determined that all fire 
departments surveyed exceeded the National Fire Protection Association’s six-minute 
guideline 90 percent of the time they responded to a call. The local ambulance agency, 
American Legion Ambulance, exceeded California’s emergency medical services 
response times in three of its designated response zones. In one community, the average 
ambulance response time was approximately one hour. The first responders commonly 
offered distance and road conditions as explanations for the delays.67 
                                                
64 California Health and Safety Code, Division 2.5, 1797.200: “Each county may develop an 
emergency medical services program. Each county developing such a program shall designate a local EMS 
agency which shall be the county health department, an agency established and operated by the county, an 
entity with which the county contracts for the purposes of local emergency medical services administration, 
or a joint powers agency created for the administration of emergency medical services by agreement 
between counties or cities and counties pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 
6500) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code.” 
65 Urban is defined as, “all census places with a population density of 101 to 500 persons per square 
mile; or census tracts ad enumeration districts without census tracts which have a population density of 101 
to 500 persons per square mile.”  Rural is defined as, “all census places with a population density of 7 to 50 
persons per square mile; or census tracts or enumeration districts without census tracts which have a 
population density of 7 to 50 persons per square mile.”  And wilderness is defined as, “census tracts or 
enumeration districts without census tracts which have a population of less than seven persons per square 
mile.”  Emergency Medical Services Authority, EMS System Standards and Guidelines, EMSA #101, June 
1993. 
66 Amador Local Agency Formation Commission, Municipal Services Review: Volume I, Public 
Review Draft, July 2008; Robert Davis, “Six Minutes to Live or Die,” USA Today, 20 May 2005, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/ems-main.htm.  
67 Amador Local Agency Formation Commission, Municipal Services Review: Volume I, Public 
Review Draft, July 2008; Los Angeles County Code, Ambulances, Chapter 7.16. 
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1. Casualty Scenario 4, Local Officer, 2009 
A sergeant with a local county sheriff’s office was working with a deputy on an 
undercover burglary operation. Around 4:30 a.m., a lone male entered the cabin where 
the officers were working. A struggle ensued. The officers were able to handcuff the 
suspect, but he pulled out at .357-caliber revolver and fired five rounds at the officers. 
The victim sergeant was shot in his arms, hands, and below his waist (severing his right 
femoral artery). Despite his wounds, the sergeant was able to return fire, killing the 
suspect instantly. The sergeant and deputy were working in a rural, mountainous setting, 
which increased the time it took EMS to evacuate the injured officer. The victim sergeant 
did not arrive at the hospital until 6:48 a.m., approximately two hours after being shot. 
Environment and Assets: the officer was in a rural setting with poor EMS response time. 
There was one other officer to assist in his emergency/ tactical medical care.68 
Even in urban areas where response time should be optimal, human error can 
cause needless deaths. An example of human error made Los Angeles headlines in 2005 
with the case of Andrew Redyk. The 64-year-old man collapsed at the Los Angeles 
International Airport and waited nearly 30 minutes for medical support to arrive in an 
area that should have received an eight-minute response. Although Redyk’s coworkers 
immediately took the appropriate actions by calling 911 and administering CPR, Redyk 
passed away. The Los Angeles Fire Department sent a fire truck and ambulance to the 
scene, which supposedly arrived in less than eight minutes, but some involved claim it 
took almost 30 minutes. The Los Angeles EMS medical director later admitted that the 
increased delay was caused by communication problems in dispatch.69 
Response times are not specific to each department but, instead, to the locations 
that members of a department are working when faced with an emergency. The areas of 
the state with the longest delays in response time are usually the rural areas. Rural, tribal, 
                                                
68 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2010, Uniform Crime Report, October 2011; Colleen Heild & Rozanna M. Martinez, “Details 
on Standoff, N.M. Deputy’s Death Emerge,” PoliceOnline, 28 July 2009, 
http://www.policeone.com/officer-shootings/articles/1860245-Details-on-standoff-N-M-deputys-death-
emerge/.  
69 Robert Davis, “Six Minutes to Live or Die,” USA Today, 20 May 2005. 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/ems-main.htm.  
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and wilderness police officers should be able to provide self-aid for long periods of time 
and know how to respond to tactical medical situations alone. This is also true for 
highway patrol officers and other state law enforcement officials who work in parts of the 
county that have reduced population density. The reality that response times are usually 
slowest in rural areas does not necessarily mean that members of an urban force should 
relax their medical training. Response times are strained during local emergencies. If an 
earthquake were to hit San Francisco, for instance, its police officers will not be able to 
rely on normal response times. Tactical or combative situations can also slow EMS 
response. For each of these reasons, police officers should not count on waiting for 
emergency medical backup when injured. Instead, law enforcement medical training must 
address the possibility of an extended delay before transport to a medical facility. 
H. WORK ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY 
The vast majority of California’s police officers work at state and local agencies. 
There are only approximately 16,000 federal law enforcement officers in California 
compared to nearly 85,000 officers at the state and local levels of government.70  The 
various law enforcement agencies working in California demonstrate that group 
affiliation in many circumstances does not dictate operational environment. Not all 
officers working for large cities are guaranteed to be working in more dangerous 
situations than the police officers working in small towns. At times it is the contrary. 
Many police officers from large cities work daytime patrol shifts and might see little 
action in a day at work. Meanwhile, some police officers from smaller departments work 
on a regional SWAT team or even a federal task force. Instead of driving a patrol car in 
the daylight, these small town officers have the opportunity to breach a drug dealer’s 
door in the middle of the night or arrest federal fugitives.   
Most police officers patrol alone. Almost all police officers are frequently 
susceptible to dangerous situations. Patrol officers working on busy highways need to 
worry about the suspect they pull over as well as the fast-moving traffic speeding by. 
                                                
70 Brian A. Reaves, PhD, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008, U.S. Department of Justice, June 
2011; Brian A. Reaves, PhD, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. 
Department of Justice, July 2011.  
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Wilderness officers have to deal with armed hunters and members of drug cartels. 
Additionally, wilderness police officers have to consider poor EMS response times on a 
daily basis. After being seriously injured, each officer, local or federal, urban or 
wilderness, should be trained to operate alone in a tactical environment for an extended 
period of time. Unlike the military, however, it is probably not necessary for law 
enforcement officers to work through a tactical medical scenario that lasts 15 or more 
hours. The next chapter discusses the TCCC procedures that are geared toward police 
officers based on the information covered in this chapter. 
 37 
III. INJURY AND TREATMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates how police officers are being killed and reviews 
potential mitigation efforts as well as preventative treatments. To determine areas of 
focus in police officer injury, chapter three begins by reexamining the common causes of 
line-of-duty deaths encountered by law enforcement officers nationwide. This follow-on 
fatality assessment suggests that little has changed regarding the causes of law 
enforcement deaths since the Sztajnkrycer study. This is useful for confirming the 
medical treatments required by police officers. The chapter then assesses Tactical 
Combat Casualty Care procedures to establish which of the military procedures are useful 
for law enforcement. To determine which procedures are relevant to police officers, it 
compares the purpose of each procedure with the officers’ common causes of line-of-duty 
death as well as their distinctive work environments (as studied in chapter two, the 
officers’ work environment relevant to medical training includes number of officers 
working together, general work setting, and EMS response times). This injury and 
treatment chapter also considers aspects of the recently published IACP Training Keys, 
because many of the Training Key procedures are geared toward police officer tactical 
medicine and support TCCC’s general guidelines.   
The analysis shows that although law enforcement officers should not learn all 
TCCC procedures, many military interventions can be useful. The necessity to learn these 
potentially useful interventions depends on the police officers’ specific mission 
requirements, work setting, and access to alternative medical support. One of the primary 
pieces of tactical medical advice for law enforcement officers that is established in this 
chapter is to focus on stopping the threat before treating the injury. The threat usually 
refers to an enemy belligerent that must be stopped before attempting treatments. 
Stopping the threat is an active procedure for police officers. The faster the threat is taken 
care of, the sooner innocent people will stop being hurt and medical care can be safely 
provided.  
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B. LINE-OF-DUTY DEATH UPDATE 
To establish the common cause of law enforcement line-of-duty deaths, this 
chapter reviews and builds upon the Sztajnkrycer study, Tactical Medical Skill 
Requirements for Law Enforcement Officers: A 10-Year Analysis of Line-of-Duty Deaths, 
which was published in Prehospital and Disaster Medicine in 2010.71  Sztajnkrycer’s 10-
year evaluation improved the existing block of literature that discusses the relevance of 
TCCC training for police officers by using a retrospective analysis of open source data to 
compare the death statistics of law enforcement officers who died as a result of felonious 
assault with the death statistics of soldiers who die in combat.  
To obtain updated fatality patterns, this thesis accessed the Law Enforcement 
Officer Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) data, which is published yearly by the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports.72  The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program is a 
coordinated effort to compile law enforcement data with the assistance of over 18,000 
law enforcement agencies nationwide. Sztajnkrycer’s 10-year evaluation examined the 
years 1998–2007, inclusive, using what was then the most up-to-date data on the LEOKA 
database. This chapter uses the same techniques as Sztajnkrycer’s 2010 evaluation to 
study the three years of line-of-duty deaths that occurred from 2008–2010 (2010 was the 
most current open source data available at the time of this study).73  
Tactical Combat Casualty Care focuses on saving the soldiers who suffer from 
potentially preventable causes of death. According to TCCC manuals, battlefield 
casualties fall into three categories: “Casualties who will die, regardless of receiving any 
medical aid; casualties who will live, regardless of receiving any medical aid;” and, 
                                                
71 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine is now the Official Journal of the World Association for Disaster 
and Emergency Medicine. Cambridge University Press assumed its publication in 2011. 
72 The Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted data 
annually as part of its Uniform Crime Reporting Program. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program was 
conceived of by the International Association of Chiefs of Police to provide reliable crime statistics in order 
to assist law enforcement professionals with carrying out their jobs. These statistics are collected by the 
FBI, analyzed, and published in its LEOKA report. 
73 FBI line-of-duty death statistics for 2011 are scheduled to be published in the fall of 2012 but as of 
1 November 2012 are still not available. 
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“casualties who will die if they do not receive timely and appropriate medical aid.”74  Of 
the three categories, TCCC addresses the third. This thesis focuses on the same: 
potentially preventable causes of death. Law enforcement officers, like soldiers, should 
be trained to prevent the deaths that they can. In a tactical environment, attempting to 
provide treatment to a patient who suffers from a non-preventable cause of death could 
risk the lives of healthy or less injured officers.  
Like the Sztajnkrycer study, head trauma that leads to death is classified here as a 
non-preventable death. Classifying all deaths caused by head trauma as non-preventable 
is a justified over-simplification. Techniques practiced in advanced TCCC instruction can 
help a care provider prevent head trauma deaths; however, proceeding within the 
boundaries set by the original study is practical, because the advanced interventions 
required to secure an airway are outside of the scope of most police officers’ medical 
training time allowances. Police officers are required to receive as little as three days of 
medical training in their initial training block, which is not enough time to learn advanced 
airway management techniques or other life saving interventions used on casualties with 
extensive head trauma.75  Thus, based on officers’ medical training time constraints, this 
analysis considers deaths from head trauma as non-preventable.   
1. Number of Officers Included in the Study 
From 2008–2010, the FBI reported on 145 police officers who were feloniously 
killed in the line-of-duty: 41 in the first year, 48 in the second year, and 56 in the third 
year, 2010. Each year the FBI includes summaries of most, but not all, of the officers 
who are feloniously killed. The agency is unable to publish summaries on certain officers 
for various reasons, such as if insufficient data related to the death exists or if the courts 
issue gag orders. From 2008–2010, six summaries of officers feloniously killed were 
excluded from the agencies Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted data. The 
                                                
74 Department of Defense, Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010. 
75 California Code of Regulations Title 22. Social Security Division 9. Prehospital Emergency 
Medical Services Chapter 1.5. First Aid Standards for Public Safety Personnel, June 2000. 
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results here are based on the officers with published summaries. Therefore, of the 145 
deaths, 139 were considered for this thesis.76 
Of the 139 officers originally considered, time of death ruled out another 48. 
Using the same framework as Sztajnkrycer’s 2010 evaluation, time of death is identified 
here as immediate if it occurred within one hour, early if it occurred between 1–48 hours, 
and late if it occurred more than 48 hours following the injury. It is assumed by this and 
the previous study that the deaths classified as immediate are those that could benefit 
most from TCCC interventions, because those officers are the most likely to die in the 
pre-hospital setting without prompt intervention.77  Out of the officer summaries included 
in the LEOKA data, six officers had times of death that were not published or could not 
be determined; 12 officers were classified as late deaths—their times of death ranged 
from a week to several years after initial injury;78 and 28 officers were classified as early 
deaths. The unknown, late, and early deaths are excluded from this study. Two additional 
officer deaths were excluded from this analysis, because the officers were off duty when 
killed. Thus, of the 139 officer summaries that are published, 91 were evaluated for their 
possible responsiveness to TCCC interventions.79 
2. Results: Line-of-Duty Deaths Potentially Amenable to TCCC 
Of the 91 officers remaining for the study, 35 could have potentially been saved 
using TCCC interventions. Forty-seven police officers died as a result of head trauma and 
are not considered as being amenable to a life-saving TCCC intervention. The majority of 
                                                
76 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
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the officers who died from a head wound were shot once or a number of times at close 
range. Another 9 officers died as a result of multi-systems trauma. The majority of the 
officers who died from multi-systems trauma were struck by a vehicle, either as an 
assailant purposefully targeted the officer with a vehicle or accidently collided with the 
officer while trying to escape from a crime. Death resulting from multi-systems trauma, 
like death caused by head trauma, is not classified as a fatality that police officers can 
prevent with TCCC due to the complexity involved in managing these wounds. 
Therefore, 56 of the 91 officers who passed exclusion criteria would likely have died 
even if treated by an officer trained in TCCC.80 
 The 35 officers remaining who could have been potentially saved with TCCC fell 
into two categories: those who died from gunshot wounds to the neck and torso and those 
that died from gunshot wounds to an extremity. Gunshot wounds to the neck or torso 
caused the majority of these potentially preventable deaths. Some officers had a single 
shot to their chest or neck. Other officers had multiple gunshot wounds spread out across 
their bodies. Like the previous study, a minute percent of the line-of-duty deaths occurred 
from exsanguination from an extremity. In this follow on study, only a single officer died 
from a gunshot wound that would likely have been preventable with a tourniquet.81   
Of the 145-officers who were feloniously killed from 2008–2010, just over 24 
percent could have potentially been saved by TCCC. These numbers of preventable 
deaths show a decrease in the number of police officer line-of-duty deaths that are 
amenable to TCCC interventions since the previous line-of-duty death study. In the 
previous study, just over 36 percent of the deaths were potentially manageable with 
TCCC. These numbers, however, like those in the previous study, do not represent a 
definitive quantity, because there is not enough forensic evidence to explain the specific 
cause of death.  (For instance, there is no way to know whether a police officer who was 
shot in the chest died from a collapsed lung versus internal blood loss.)  The FBI to date 
does not have an open source reporting system that will allow researchers to determine 
absolute medical conclusions. This line-of-duty death study is useful, however, because it 




presents additional definitive data that supports the previous study’s conclusion that law 
enforcement medical training requirements differ from those in the military.82 
C. TACTICAL COMBAT CASUALTY CARE 
The military prides itself on being a learning organization that actively studies its 
performance as well as the performance of its enemies to develop the most relevant 
tactics based on the mission. TCCC represents the military’s efforts to flex to the 
demands of contemporary combat situations and adopt tactics most suited to the present-
day warfighter. Due to the unique demands of combat, the military chooses to be 
unconstrained by a fixed set of procedures that are based on the civilian laws that govern 
emergency medicine. Since police officers also need to develop tactical medical training 
to suit their work environment, this sections reviews TCCC and assesses its interventions 
for potential use in law enforcement.  
Tactical Combat Casualty care, which is founded on real-world tactical situations, 
is an evolving set of tactical interventions that are informed by combat casualties and 
their outcomes. TCCC instruction manuals go as far as to warn operators that new 
technologies, data, and tactical challenges will make current TCCC medical procedures 
obsolete at some point in the future. TCCC’s tactical, threat-oriented approach may be its 
only enduring legacy. The medicine makes all attempts to emphasize the importance of 
practicing threat-oriented tactics, while administering medicine. According to the 2010 
TCCC Handbook, “TCCC focuses very directly on the immediate care of battle casualties 
. . . where the threat,” the common causes of soldier injury, and the operator’s skills “all 
come together.”83  Focusing on the threat before providing treatment is an imperative part 
of tactical medicine and is one of the most important things that police officer tactical 
medicine can benefit from.84 
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Concentrating on the threat is the very first intervention involved in TCCC and 
should be the leading intervention taught in all tactical medical training. Considering the 
threat before the victim is not a novel concept in emergency medicine; civilian 
paramedics are also instructed to make sure the scene is safe before providing medical 
aid. What differs is how the operators ensure scene safety. In the civilian context, 
safeguarding a scene before providing medical care is often a passive procedure, which 
involves circumstances such as making sure a hazardous material substance is identified 
or a gun battle has ceased before rendering medical care to wounded casualties. Even the 
recently published Training Keys offered by the IACP, discuss risks to the rescuers 
(responding police officers) in a more passive tone than the TCCC instruction does. The 
Keys explain an officer’s role as a first responder but do so as if the officer is not already 
part of the tactical situation.85 
In the military context, ensuring the scene is safe frequently takes on an active 
role such as getting to cover while returning fire. The operator must neutralize the 
immediate threat before providing medical care, even if it involves shooting at an enemy. 
To underline the importance of focusing on tactics before medical procedures, military 
instructors tell operators repeatedly: “The best medicine on the battlefield is fire 
superiority.”86  Handling the threat before treating the injury allows the medical care 
provider to prevent further harm—this caveat goes for the medical care provider as well 
as the injured person, (in the cases that the two are different).87 
Note: The explanations of tactical scenarios included in this discussion of TCCC 
often refer to the medic (or care provider) and the casualty (or patient) separately as if 
they are always distinct individuals; however, in tactical settings, often the medic is the 
casualty or the casualty applies self or buddy-aid becoming the medic. The latter situation 
can be especially common among police officers who work alone or operate in groups 
without personnel classified as medics. Even in scenarios where multiple personnel are 
                                                
85 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key #667, 2012; Department of Defense, 
Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010. 
86 Department of Defense, Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010. 
87 Ibid. 
 44 
available or where one officer is designated as a medic, tactical situations can dictate that 
the casualty should apply self-aid to prevent further injury to others. For instance, if a 
police officer would need to risk being shot to assist his partner, the partner should 
attempt self-aid instead of waiting for help and endangering the assisting officer. The 
importance of self-aid is expounded on in the description of TCCC’s specific 
interventions. For now it is primarily important to understand that the term medic and 
patient are only used to clearly describe roles in a scenario. The medic or care provider is 
any person giving aid, the victim or secondary companion.88 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care is divided into three phases to account for the 
tactical environment: Care Under Fire, Tactical Field care, and Tactical Evacuation Care. 
Care Under Fire represents the tactical interventions rendered at the point of injury. This 
occurs while both the medic and the casualty are under effective hostile fire.  (The 
military delineates between fire and effective fire. Sometimes gunfire will still be present 
when administering aid, but that gunfire will not be hitting nearby or directed effectively 
at the casualty or medic; this is not effective fire.)  Effective fire occurs when bullets are 
landing nearby the medic or the casualty, putting them at immediate risk. The tactical risk 
guides the limited interventions that are provided in the initial, Care Under Fire, phase of 
TCCC. Additionally, it is assumed that only limited medical gear is available to the 
medic during the Care Under Fire stage. If proper tactics are ignored at any point in a 
tactical situation, medical interventions can result in additional casualties. This initial 
phase will in many ways mirror police officer tactical scenarios, when officers have 
limited medical gear and are under immediate danger.89 
Tactical Field Care is the second phase of medical care recommended in a tactical 
situation. Once the medic and casualty are no longer under effective fire, a more 
comprehensive set of interventions can be applied to the casualty. Again, the tactical 
situation dictates the depth of care that is given; however, generally this is the point when 
the patient can be thoroughly inspected. Based on the time constraints and threat level, 
the operator will determine the appropriateness of each procedure. This phase, and the 




interventions performed during it, can also apply to tactical medical situations that occur 
in the absence of hostile fire or a direct threat. Examples of Tactical Field Care scenarios 
that occur in the absence of hostile fire situations include if an operator is injured while 
approaching a target during a night raid, while on an undercover stakeout, or while 
surveying a target in a remote location. The timeframe between injury and evacuation 
fluctuates in this setting. For soldiers it can vary from minutes to days. A more likely 
timeframe for law enforcement officers, however, is minutes to hours.90 
The third phase of care explained in TCCC training is Tactical Evacuation Care. 
This phase begins when auxiliary medical care equipment and providers arrive and the 
operators prepare to evacuate the casualty. In a military setting, the evacuation platform 
can be a boat, helicopter, or a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV, 
pronounced humvee), and it can arrive with or without trained medical personnel. 
Soldiers sometimes have additional duties at this point depending on the scenario and 
type of support that arrives. The medical evacuation platform is often pre-staged with 
additional medical equipment that the medic is trained to use but could not carry on the 
mission. Other times advanced medical personnel will arrive and relieve the on-scene 
medic of his duties.91  
For civilian police officers, the evacuation platform that arrives at this stage will 
likely be an ambulance or a life flight helicopter. In most cases the evacuation platform 
will be equipped with skilled medical care providers and their equipment. The law 
enforcement officers’ medical responsibilities are generally relieved during this TCCC 
phase of care; although, the IACP Training Keys point out that in some extreme 
situations such as when EMS assets are strained, police officers can be forced to transfer 
casualties to the hospital in squad cars or other non-conventional platforms.92  When 
police officers are active in transporting the patients, they need to be aware of the 
ongoing treatments required in the third phase. The specific procedures involved in each 
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of the three phases are discussed below in detail and compared to civilian EMS 
procedures like those learned in Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) and the recently 
published Training Keys.93 
1. Care Under Fire 
The military considers the risk of additional injuries extremely high during the 
Care Under Fire phase. Detailed medical procedures at this point are complicated by 
several factors such as limited medical gear, hostile surroundings, and reduced ambient 
light. The military suggests only three major actions during this phase: suppressing 
hostile fire, moving the casualty to a safe location, and treating life-threatening 
hemorrhage. Rapid successful completion of the combat mission is encouraged as a 
useful way to prevent further injury, as it improves the medic’s ability to focus on the 
patient. For police officers completing the mission could mean making their arrest and 
should have similar positive influence in improving a medical provider’s ability to care 
for the casualty. Police officers working in a team have an advantage at this point. Team 
settings contribute additional bodies and firearms that will help the officers gain fire 
superiority and dominate the hostile scene.94   
a. Airway Management 
Airway management refers to performing interventions that will allow a 
casualty to breath or breath easier. It is addressed first here, because many Emergency 
Medical Technician and police officer training programs teach students to tackle airway 
management first when approaching a casualty. Compared to civilian emergency medical 
training, airway management is deemphasized in combat medicine. Unlike civilian EMS 
providers, combat medics are trained to forego airway management until the second 
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phase of interventions. Statistics show that airway compromises have only affected 1–2 
percent of combat casualties. Furthermore, airway management techniques are time 
consuming. Attempting to manage an airway can take several minutes. Since rapidly 
moving the casualty to safety is a major concern in the Care Under Fire phase, the 
military teaches operators to wait until they are away from hostile fire before attempting 
airway management. Police officers should do the same.95 
b. Hemorrhage Control 
Stopping a life-threatening extremity (arm or leg) bleed is the number one 
medical intervention advised by military medical experts during the Care Under Fire 
phase. Reports from the battlefield show that the leading cause of preventable death 
among soldiers is exsanguination from extremity wounds. Studies covering the Vietnam 
War show that more than 2,500 soldiers died from extremity exsanguination alone. 
Uncontrolled hemorrhage can also lead to death faster than a compromised airway, which 
is why it is addressed in this first phase of treatment. If life-threatening bleeding is 
ignored in the Care Under Fire phase, the casualty could die before reaching the second 
phase of care.96 
Note: Not all bleeding is life threatening. Life threatening hemorrhage 
generally comes from a major artery and causes the patient to lose large amounts of blood 
in a short period of time. Venous bleeding, on the other hand, will usually seep out less 
rapidly. Small venous hemorrhages should be cared for later in the second phase of 
treatment.97 
When a casualty shows signs of life-threatening hemorrhage from an 
extremity, TCCC advise the use of a tourniquet. A tourniquet has several advantages in a 
tactical setting over other medical equipment that can be used to control bleeding. For 
instance, many conventional ATLS measures endorsed by civilian medical professionals 
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are not as reliable at stopping the bleed in tactical situations when interventions need to 
be applied at night amidst hostile gunfire. Although the IACP Training Keys support the 
use of a tourniquet, they do not make a strong stance on determining when it should be 
applied. They instead say that direct pressure is the most efficient way to stop bleeding;98 
this could be misleading and confuse officers in a tactical setting. Additionally, any 
reluctance to advocate use a tourniquet could make tourniquets appear dangerous and 
discourage their timely use in a tactical setting. 
Standard field dressings that rely on pressure applied directly to the wound 
are more difficult than a tourniquet to put in place, especially at night. Also, when placed 
incorrectly, pressure dressings will allow the wound to continue to bleed. Trying to 
position the dressings correctly takes longer than securing a tourniquet. The time wasted 
trying to secure the pressure dressing puts the casualty or the medic at an unnecessary 
risk. Tourniquets are simple, quick, and effective. Moreover, they can be secure with one 
hand. This allows the casualty to control the wound without outside support.99 
c. Casualty Transportation 
Like other procedures examined here, TCCC teaches soldiers to remove 
casualties from a hazardous environment by utilizing a different set of techniques and 
focusing on an alternative set of precautions than those used in standard civilian 
emergency medicine. When preparing for casualty transport, civilian EMS responders are 
focused on protecting the patient by making sure the patient’s wounds are not further 
complicated by the move. Special precautions are used to immobilize the patient’s neck 
to avoid injury to the spine. Soldiers and police officers are not able to spend as much 
time worrying about injuring the patient’s spine or complicating the patient’s wounds 
while being shot at by adversaries. Instead, they must focus on saving the casualty’s life 
as well as the lives of others. The risk of sustaining additional injuries from the active 
threat outweighs the risk of compounding an injury or hurting the patient’s neck.100 
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Studies from Vietnam show that immobilizing the cervical spine may not 
be as important in a military setting as it is in non-tactical civilian settings. Only 1.4 
percent of casualties with penetrating neck injuries in that war could have potentially 
benefitted from immobilizing their spine before transport. Unless the casualty is suffering 
from significant blunt trauma, such as parachute injuries or being hit by a car (the latter 
of which is common in police officer deaths that occur from multi-systems trauma), 
cervical spine immobilization is not useful in a tactical setting. It is possible that police 
officers who are suffering from a gunshot wound to the neck or torso are also less suited 
to civilian non-tactical cervical spine precautions.101 
As opposed to cervical spine immobilization, in most situations, the precautions 
soldiers and other operators must be focused on in a tactical setting stem from the threat. 
The danger presented by the threat of hostile fire means that casualties should be moved 
to a safe location using the most expedient and safest way possible. Lifting and carrying 
the casualty can be difficult and slow or require assistance from multiple people at the 
scene. Alternate means of transport should be considered in the Care Under Fire phase. 
Dragging is one method that has been used successfully in the military. Military 
instructors also advocate that operators involved in casualty transport should utilize cover 
and concealment as much as possible. Cover is preferred over concealment, but both are 
useful. These techniques are endorsed by IACP Training Keys and would be useful for 
police officers in tactical scenarios.102   
2. Tactical Field Care 
 When distanced from the immediate threat of hostile fire, care providers 
can focus on a more comprehensive set of interventions. A detailed study of the 
casualty’s wounds begins in the second phase, Tactical Field Care. In military settings, 
the scene is still not considered 100 percent safe. Soldiers who are injured in combat are 
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often in unfriendly geographic locations surrounded by inhabitants that are hostile or 
belligerent. Tactical Field Care takes this into consideration and recognizes the imminent 
presence of new potential threats. This phase may be somewhat altered in a civilian 
setting if, for instance, the law enforcement officers are in friendly territory and have 
already neutralized the initial threat during the Care Under Fire phase; however, in other 
law enforcement settings, such as a terrorist attack that involves more than one suspect, 
the Tactical Field Care setting would be more similar to that faced by soldiers.103 
Care for a casualty in this phase of treatment is situational dependent. If the threat 
level is high or if security is unstable, medical interventions must be prioritized based on 
the needs of the individual patient. The most essential treatments will be given as quickly 
as possible, and other treatments will be deferred until later. If the situation is more under 
control, if the soldiers have managed to put great distance between themselves and the 
threat, or if massive numbers of reinforcements have arrived, more attention can be given 
to the patient.104 
a. Altered Mental Status 
Early in the patient’s evaluation process, mental status must be 
determined. Soldiers are directed to immediately disarm casualties that present with 
altered mental status. If a casualty has altered mental status, the casualty is a threat to 
friendly forces. This is true for police officers working in teams or with partners. A 
casualty with altered mental status is no longer an asset, and should be dealt with 
accordingly.105  
b. Hemorrhage Control 
Like during Care Under Fire, hemorrhage control is TCCC’s primary 
concern in the second phase of treatment. Once the casualty is distanced from the primary 
threat, bleeding should be reassessed. This requires a secondary evaluation of the 
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patient’s wounds to ensure that all life-threatening bleeding has been controlled. The 
military directs medics to remove only the minimal amounts of clothing required to treat 
the wound, because hypothermia is a medical concern in trauma patients. Tourniquets are 
still the primary method for controlling extremity hemorrhage at this phase in the 
treatment. Other non-extremity bleeds can be controlled with gauze, hemostatic 
bandages, and various blood clotting agents. Medics are told to check for a distal pulse 
and to apply a second tourniquet side-by-side and proximal (closer to the torso) to the 
first if a distal pulse remains in an extremity with a tourniquet. IACP Training Keys 
advise using the same dual tourniquet method to manage out of control bleeds.106  
The military stresses the importance and safety of tourniquet use. Its 
TCCC Handbook explains that, “there is no evidence that tourniquets have caused the 
loss of any limbs in hundreds of tourniquet applications.”107  If medics chose to remove a 
tourniquet, it warns medics to use caution. Tourniquets can remain in place for hours and 
should not be removed until the casualty is at the evacuation point. Once at the point of 
evacuation, tourniquets can be replaced with a pressure dressing but do not need to be. 
The choice to remove a tourniquet is at the medic’s discretion. The IACP Training Keys 
also recognize the safety of tourniquets and tell officers how to improvise a tourniquet if 
necessary.108  Although far less police officer deaths occur from extremity bleeds, a 
tourniquet could still be carried by law enforcement, due to the tourniquet’s history of 
safe use, simplicity, size, tactical efficiency, and potential for saving a life, even if it is 
just a single life every three years.   
c. Airway Management 
Only after the life-threatening bleeds have been addressed should the 
medic be concerned with airway management. In many cases of penetrating trauma, 
airway management is unnecessary. If the patient is awake, alert, and having no 
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difficulties breathing, the medic can move past airway management without applying 
interventions. If the patient is having difficulty breathing, the medic should consider 
interventions progressively, beginning with the least invasive. Three procedures are 
preferred for managing a casualty’s airway: performing a chin-lift jaw-thrust maneuver, 
inserting a nasopharyngeal airway, and performing a cricothyroidotomy. Of the three, 
performing a chin-lift jaw-thrust maneuver is the least invasive and should be attempted 
first.109 
Inserting a nasopharyngeal airway is advised for all unconscious trauma 
patients. Nasopharyngeal airway insertion is quick and easy. It is preferred over other 
means of airway management, because it is more likely to be tolerated if the casualty 
becomes conscious. This management technique, like the chin-lift jaw-thrust maneuver, 
is not invasive and would be a valuable option for police officers who need to maintain 
an airway. The nasopharyngeal airway is lightweight, portable, and durable. Police 
officers can learn to use it in a short period of time and would have no problem carrying 
it on their person.110 
The third airway management technique preferred by the military is not 
used as widely by civilian EMS and would therefore be more difficult for police units to 
adopt.111  A cricothyroidotomy is an invasive procedure that involves making a small 
incision on the casualty’s airway and inserting a breathing tube. In a tactical setting, the 
military prefers this technique to intubation—the more mainstream, civilian endorsed 
technique—for multiple reasons: airways achieved by intubation are not tolerated well by 
a conscious patient; intubation requires a white light, which could negotiate a soldier’s 
position in a tactical environment; and blood or disrupted anatomy can make it difficult to 
identify parts of the anatomy that guide intubation. Additionally, cricothyroidotomys can 
be performed on conscious patients and are the procedure of choice when a patient has 
penetrating wounds in the head or neck. Despite its use in the military, this thesis does 
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not advocate surgical interventions for police officer training due to the officers’ mission 
requirements and medical training time constraints. Furthermore, these invasive 
techniques generally require an additional care provider, which many patrol officers 
lack.112 
d. Breathing 
The number one breathing issue that the military is concerned with 
treating is a tension pneumothorax. Tension pneumothoraxes are common when patients 
suffer gunshot wounds to the neck and torso. This condition is treatable with simple 
interventions. Since the injury accounts for 3–4 percent of all combat deaths, the second 
leading cause of preventable death on the battlefield, TCCC instruction declares that all 
patients with open wounds to the neck and torso should be treated as potentially having a 
tension pneumothorax. Due to the large percentage of police officers who die from 
gunshot wounds to the chest and neck, some interventions used to treat a tension 
pneumothorax should also be considered for law enforcement officers.113 
To treat this injury, military medics place an occlusive dressing over the 
wound or wounds in the torso and neck. The patient is then placed in the seated position 
when appropriate. If the casualty develops difficulty breathing and other signs of a 
tension pneumothorax, the medic is directed to relieve the symptoms by performing a 
needle thoracostomy (inserting a 14-gauge 3.25-inch long needle catheter into the 
casualty’s second intercostal space on the mid-clavicular line, just below the collar bone). 
This is done on the side of the injury. The medic will listen for a sound as air is released. 
If no sound is heard and the patient continues to have difficulty breathing, the medic will 
try the other side. This procedure is not life threatening; “the additional trauma caused by 
a needle thoracostomy will not worsen his [the casualty’s] condition should he not have a 
tension pneumothorax.”114  At worst, the additional trauma caused by the needle 
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thoracostomy will need to be treated later at a definitive medical treatment facility. In the 
meantime, the casualty’s life might have been saved by the intervention.115 
Although performing a needle thoracostomy is not considered dangerous, 
even if the wrong lung is punctured with the medic’s catheter, police officers can 
consider a less-invasive technique for managing the injuries that cause tension 
pneumothoraxes. The IACP Training Keys, like TCCC, suggest placing a four-sided 
occlusive dressing over the wound. The Training Keys, however, add a series of steps not 
used by soldiers who perform a needle thoracostomy. They explain that a care provider 
should wait until the casualty has exhaled all air before placing the four-sided occlusive 
dressing on the wound. If pressure later builds up in the patient’s chest, which can be 
determined by increased difficulty in breathing, the four-sided dressing is briefly 
removed and then reapplied. This non-invasive option can possibly suit police officer 
needs better than the invasive technique advocated by the military.116 
e. Intravenous (IV) Access and Fluid Resuscitation  
Military medics are taught to start an intravenous (IV) catheter at this 
point in the treatment. IVs are important for stabilizing the patent’s blood pressure and 
administering medication. Whereas ATLS courses teach civilian EMS personnel to start 
two large bore (14-or 16-gauge) IV catheters, the military advocates using a single 18-
guage IV catheter in tactical environments. In casualties that have lost a considerable 
amount of blood, it is difficult to gain vascular access because the veins are less 
prominent. An 18-guage IV catheter is easier to start than the larger bore catheters and is 
deemed sufficient by the military for administering resuscitation fluids and medications 
to trauma patients. If IV access cannot be obtained, intraosseous (IO) (in the bone 
marrow cavity) access should be gained. These invasive techniques often require a 
second person and always require advanced training that could be unnecessary for police 
officers.117  
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Based on the advance training requirements and the standard EMS 
response times that many police officers can rely on, IV and IO insertions are not 
recommended for law enforcement in most settings. These techniques could be useful for 
rural police, but more forensic information on rural police officer deaths is needed to 
make the determination. If a number of rural officers are dying from complications that 
could have been prevented with more expedient IV access, then perhaps rural police 
should be trained in administering some form of fluid resuscitation; however, unless they 
are working in pairs or teams, IV and IO training could be impractical. While it is 
possible to self-administer an IV, patients who need fluid resuscitation to prevent death 
before EMS backup arrives will probably not be in a condition that allows them to self-
administer the procedure.118 
f. Pain and Infection Control 
Administering medications to control pain and infection is essential in 
military settings. For police officers with close EMS backup, this is less critical. Like IV 
access, administering pain and infection control medication is probably most important 
for officers who work in areas with extended EMS response time. TCCC training teaches 
medics to administer different drugs depending on the casualty. If the casualty is 
conscious, oral medications can be given. If not, IV or IO lines will have to be utilized. 
Additionally, medications are varied depending on if the casualty is still able to fight. As 
far as infection, all open wounds are considered infected, and medics are instructed to 
administer antibiotics that cover a broad spectrum of organisms. If police officers 
administer any medications, it must be documented to provide EMS providers and 
hospitals with relevant information to avoid overdose.119 
g. Hypothermia Prevention  
Blood loss contributes to hypothermia.  (Hypothermia occurs when the 
body’s temperature drops below 95 degrees Fahrenheit.)  Since blood loss is a concern in 




all cases of penetrating trauma, both soldiers and police officers will benefit from 
understanding the basics of temperature control in trauma patients. Although wet 
conditions increase chances for hypothermia, the condition can affect trauma casualties 
regardless of the season or air temperature.   
Hypothermic coagulopathy is a bleeding disorder that impairs the blood’s 
ability to clot. This is dangerous for trauma patients who have lost large amounts of 
blood. Since up to 10 percent of trauma patients who arrive at Level III treatment 
facilities exhibit some degree of hypothermia, police officers should learn how to combat 
the condition with simple-to-learn interventions. The techniques used to keep a trauma 
casualty warm are no different than techniques used to keep any person warm. Police 
should keep the casualty covered at all times with dry blankets or protective clothing if 
hypothermia is a potential.120 
h. Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care does not advocate CPR in all of the same 
situations that civilian EMS training does. Casualties injured by blast or penetrating 
injuries that are found without “pulse, respiration, or other signs of life,” are not 
recommended for CPR by TCCC guidelines.121  The military does not want soldiers 
attempting CPR in hopeless situations, because it puts operators at unnecessary risk and 
prevents casualties with less severe injuries from receiving timely care. Studies have 
shown that even when casualties are close to definitive care centers, CPR has not been 
proven successful on patients with the aforementioned symptoms if caused by penetrating 
trauma or blast injuries. CPR is only suggested before evacuation on patients suffering 
from non-trauma wounds. The IACP Training Keys support TCCC guidelines on CPR. 
The Keys tell police officers that CPR is most useful for non-trauma casualties suffering 
a cardiac arrest. While police officers should learn CPR for other duties involved in 
protecting society, it is not a useful skill in combative tactical settings.122 
                                                
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key #668, 2012; Department of Defense, 
Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010. 
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i. Burns 
TCCC provides detailed information on how to deal with burns; however, 
since no police officers suffered fatal burn injuries in the studies reviewed here, training 
that enables police officers to treat burns is not considered necessary in a combative 
tactical setting.123  
j. Monitoring Treatments  
Patients should be continuously monitored during this phase. Once initial 
treatments are provided, they should be reassessed as frequently as the tactical situation 
allows. Reviewing previous interventions can reveal new wounds not found in earlier 
assessments. Speaking with the patient can also expose new wounds or potential areas of 
consideration. Motoring the patient continuously until evacuation is essential for both 
military and law enforcement officers.124 
k. Communication 
Military advice on communication will likely resonate with law 
enforcement officers who have operational experience in tactical environments involving 
casualties. TCCC training endorses active communication between the casualty and 
medic. The medic’s vocal reassurance has curative properties. Combat and gun battles, 
whether military or civilian, can be frightening, especially for a casualty. Speaking with 
the casualty is not only useful for obtaining diagnostic information but also for 
encouragement.125 
                                                
123 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed 
and Assaulted, 2008, Uniform Crime Report, October 2009; U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 2009, Uniform Crime Report, October 
2010; U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2010, Uniform Crime Report, October 2011. 
124 Department of Defense, Handbook: Tactical Casualty Combat Care, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures, no. 10–44, May 2010. 
125 Ibid. 
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3. Tactical Evacuation Care 
During the Tactical Evacuation Care phase, military personnel often need to 
continue reassessing the interventions provided in earlier phases of TCCC; the arrival of 
new equipment can even expand the medics’ role. Conversely, law enforcement officers 
are almost done performing their role as a medical provider in the Tactical Evacuation 
Care phase. In situations where police officers must transport victims to the hospital, their 
main focus will be reassessing previous treatments, unless new medical equipment, like a 
tourniquet, arrives to expand the police officers medical role. Although the police 
officer’s medical duties will likely cease when civilian medical support arrives, the 
officer who applied interventions can be instrumental in helping the EMS providers 
identify areas that require immediate attention. Officers can help by quickly briefing 
EMS personnel on the interventions provided by law enforcement personnel before the 
EMS arrival. 
D. INJURY AND TREATMENT SUMMARY  
The updated line-of-duty death analysis performed here revealed little change 
since Sztajnkrycer’s former study. The leading cause of death for officers who expire in 
the first hour following their injury is head trauma. These deaths are considered non-
preventable by the tactical medical training procedures that can be taught to police 
officers; the officers’ medical training time constraints, professional duties, and mission 
requirements limit the extent of medical training that is practical. For casualties with 
serious head trauma, this thesis, like the recently published IACP Training Keys, suggests 
foregoing police officer medical interventions beyond hemorrhage control and making all 
possible attempts to get a casualty to a secondary medical facility as quickly as 
possible.126   
Interventions regarding burn care, IV placement, and the administration of 
medication are also unnecessary in most cases for police officer tactical medical training. 
No officers in this thesis were shown to have died of complications amenable to these 
                                                
126 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key #668, 2012. 
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advanced medical techniques in the first hour. Only officers who face long EMS response 
times should consider learning these detailed interventions. 
Another large percent of police officers died from gunshot wounds to their neck 
or torso. It is unknown how many of these injuries were complicated by a tension 
pneumothorax that ultimately caused the death. If forensic evidence later proves that a 
significant number of these officers are dying, like soldiers, from tension 
pneumothoraxes, law enforcement agencies can investigate the value of teaching police 
officers invasive medical procedures. Until then, a non-invasive technique that police 
officers can use to manage tension pneumothoraxes is explained in greater detail in the 
recently published in the IACP Training Keys. For police officers, this technique appears 
more practical than the military’s invasive procedure.127 
Certain TCCC interventions would benefit police officers. One of the most 
important TCCC techniques for police officers to learn regarding tactical medicine is 
focusing on the tactical threat before treating the injury. Doing this will save police 
officers’ and civilians’ lives. Another potentially useful intervention is the tourniquet. 
While only a small percentage of police officers die from extremity exsanguination, 
tourniquets might prevent these deaths. Furthermore, there are no contradictory medical 
indications that prevent police officers from carrying a tourniquet. Tourniquets are simple 
to use, inexpensive, and safe. Other interventions that police officers should be trained to 
administer are those involving continuous communication, hypothermia prevention, and 
repeated monitoring of the medical interventions applied. These interventions, like the 
tourniquet, require little training and are proven effective in managing a casualty’s health 
in a tactical environment. 
                                                
127 U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Officers Killed 
and Assaulted, 2008, Uniform Crime Report, October 2009; U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau 
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IV. LESSONS FOR POLICE OFFICER MEDICINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The special operations personnel who created Tactical Combat Casualty Care and 
have subsequently developed advanced TCCC training procedures based on combat 
lessons did so because civilian medical training was found to be insufficient for military 
tactical situations. Today, some experts argue that law enforcement medicine can learn 
from these developments in TCCC. But to develop tactical medicine that is relevant for 
the warfighter, military medical experts have continuously sought updated medical data 
combined with tactical recommendations from the battlefield. The military tactical 
medical training that developed from that data is more useful for military combatants 
than for law enforcement personnel, and it should not be adopted by law enforcement 
agencies before they review its purpose and make necessary adjustments.   
While some TCCC techniques, particularly the basics, are applicable to all police 
officers, including lone patrol officers, the officers’ unique medical assets, mission 
requirements, and work environments necessitate slightly altered medical procedures in 
many situations. Police officers need to develop more standardized medicine that is 
specific to law enforcement situations based on officer experiences in the field. To 
improve police officer specific medical training, law enforcement medical experts should 
embrace the technique of gathering job specific medical, tactical, and forensic data 
surrounding police officer casualty situations. As described in this chapter, data 
collection can be improved by implementing a more detailed reporting process 
nationwide.   
Some prominent law enforcement data collection and tactical medical training 
instruction has already been accomplished. Sztajnkrycer’s 2010 line-of-duty death study 
revealed that police officers are dying from different mechanisms of injury than military 
combatants. More recently, the Training Keys released by the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police focus on law enforcement specific tactical medicine that can be 
embraced by all officers at any department, whether working alone or in teams. 
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Procedures advocated in the Training Keys embrace tactical techniques that account for 
law enforcement medical assets and mission requirements. Still, future IACP instruction 
must emphasize the importance of actively eliminating the threat. 
B. TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The four casualty scenarios presented in chapter two of this thesis show the need 
for police officer tactical medical training that focuses on teaching life-saving medical 
interventions in environments that may not be suitable to standard civilian medicine. 
Some basic guidelines of TCCC training, which focus on stopping the threat before 
treating an injury as well as attempting self-aid when possible, would be useful for police 
officers in all four scenarios presented here as well as all of the FBI’s LEOKA summaries 
reviewed for this thesis.   
One advantage of adopting basic TCCC guidelines stems from their wide-ranging 
applicability for law enforcement casualty scenarios regardless of the number of officers 
involved. Some of the injured officers studied in this thesis were accompanied by a 
partner or a team, while other casualties had nobody to assist in their medical treatments. 
From 2001–2010, the most recent data available, on-duty police officers were alone when 
feloniously killed 36 percent of the time. Another 33 percent were working in a lone 
patrol vehicle but were assisted by one or more officers who were on the scene when the 
assault took place. It is essential that police officers be taught to apply self-treatments as 
their primary recourse. 
Another advantage of adopting basic TCCC guidelines is that they put an 
emphasis on teaching officers to continue fighting after being wounded. Continuing to 
fight after sustaining an injury is essential for eliminating the threat. If officers focus first 
on their injury, the threat could overwhelm them, cause injuries to others on the scene, or 
both. In several of the LEOKA summaries, officers proved their ability to continue 
fighting after being wounded; however, continuing to engage the threat after being 
wounded is not necessarily a common reaction. It must be stressed verbally as well as 
rehearsed during training.  
 63 
As stated in chapter one and advocated by the military, realistic training is 
essential for grasping TCCC’s basic guidelines. Practicing becoming incapacitated after 
being shot in training can create training scars and impair the way officers react in real 
scenarios. Officers should practice continuing to fight (not lie still) after being wounded 
in training scenarios. Additionally, interventions that are taught in training scenarios, 
such as applying a dressing, should be practiced with the actual dressings that the officers 
will use in the field and should be done in environments that are similar to the tactical 
environments police officers might encounter; for instance, officers should practice 
applying medical interventions outside, both during the day and at night, and in inclement 
weather. This will allow them to recognize potential problems with their tactics and find 
solutions before put into an actual casualty scenario when an officer’s life is on the line. 
The environments where police officers are assaulted are seldom optimal for 
providing medical care. Most of the line-of-duty assaults studied in this thesis that led to 
death were the result of gunfire. If a suspect is still shooting or if another threat is present, 
the tactical situation will dictate the depth of care that is optimal. Almost 50 percent of 
the officers studied between 2001–2010 were assaulted between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., when 
darkness would likely frustrate efforts to visualize wounds or apply treatments. Since 
tactical situations sometimes dictate that interventions be applied in low light or rapidly, 
due to an active threat, the simplest effective interventions should be rehearsed as 
primary interventions. An example of a simple intervention for controlling extremity 
hemorrhages is the tourniquet.   
While EMS response times are generally quick for police officers, several 
elements can slow the response. In the fourth casualty scenario offered in this thesis, 
which is based on a scenario that occurred in 2009, the sheriff died because EMS 
personnel were delayed due to the rural location and consequent breakdowns in lines of 
communication. If the casualty or his partner could have controlled the bleeding before 
EMS arrived, he would have had a better chance of surviving the incident. Similar to the 
military’s delayed evacuation experience in Mogadishu, this law enforcement experience 
shows a potential need for more detailed medical instruction in rural environments. Of 
the casualty summaries and work environments reviewed for this thesis, rural location 
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was the primary cause of delayed EMS response. While no EMS should be relied upon to 
the point that officers neglect basic guidelines of tactical medicine, police officers should 
consider learning advanced medical procedures in rural settings, where EMS response 
time is known to be inadequate on a regular basis. 
C. STANDARD POLICE OFFICER TRAINING RECOMMENDATION 
Many members of the U.S. armed forces are taught different levels of TCCC 
based on their specific duties in whichever unit they are attached to. Snipers in the SEAL 
Teams, for instance, usually do not need to know the detailed medical interventions 
learned by SEAL medics, but they still learn the fundamentals of TCCC training to 
improve their situational awareness and to make them more useful in a casualty scenario.   
Like members of the military, police officers should learn different levels of the 
same block of standard medical training, whether it is called Tactical Emergency Medical 
Support (TEMS) or any other name. The level of medical training they learn should be 
based on their individual job at an agency as well as their working environment. A more 
standard block of police officer medical instruction could help police officers in many 
ways. First of all, a more standard set of procedures would cause departments to develop 
procedures based on a broader sample of casualty experiences, and allow the agencies to 
learn from law enforcement casualty situations nationwide. Additionally, it would make 
their training recognized across state lines. 
Furthermore, standard medical training will help police officers across multiple 
jurisdictions work together more safely. Skillsets involved in working together are 
increasingly important in today’s environment, as agencies are challenged to coordinate 
their efforts to battle crime and terrorism. When local police departments join forces with 
federal agencies on a raid, as discussed in chapter three, both must be prepared to 
administer life saving care to their counterparts.   
Working together may even become more common in the future as new 
technologies are developed that facilitate integration. As an example of how such 
integration is accomplished, on 18 April 2012, federal and local law enforcement 
agencies conducted a multi-agency operation in Clarksburg, West Virginia, to arrest a 
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major drug supplier. Leading to the arrest, seventy agents used a virtual command center 
on the Law Enforcement Online network to share information about the case. To conduct 
the arrest, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Internal Revenue Service, West Virginia State 
Police, U.S. Marshals Service, Clarksburg Police department, Bridgeport Police 
Department, and the Harrison County Sheriff’s office joined forces. Having the same 
tactical training that teaches officers to stay in the fight when wounded, and the ability to 
use standard medical terminology and equipment carried by officers across jurisdictions 
and levels of the government will prepare the officers to react more seamlessly when an 
officer from another agency is wounded during a multi-agency raid.128 
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS TO IMPROVE TRAINING 
Being taught to continue fighting after sustaining a gunshot wound is not the only 
non-medical tactical training that will help save police officers’ lives; the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation has developed training based on its LEOKA database that is designed to 
help officers avoid many types of injury. The FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) Division developed a training program called the LEOKA Officer Safety/ 
Awareness Program, which is used to inform officers of ways to avoid risk. CJIS’ 
LEOKA trainers, all of whom are former law enforcement officers with extensive law 
enforcement backgrounds, travel throughout the United States each year to give 
instruction to other agencies; however, not enough agencies participate in the training.   
Although the LEOKA training provides information on a wide spectrum of 
subjects, from conducting a traffic stop to felony pursuit, only approximately 11,000 
officers from 3,000 agencies received the training last year. That means just over one 
percent of the sworn police officers working in the United States received this instruction. 
Because the LEOKA Officer Safety/ Awareness Program training is an evolving program 
designed to prevent death based on reviewed causes of police officer injury, it might be 
useful for more law enforcement agencies than those that currently benefit from it. 
Furthermore, if found useful, it could be adapted to the initial police officer medical 
                                                
128 Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Information Services Division, CJIS Link, vol. 
14, no. 2, July 2012. 
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training received at police academies nationwide, especially if police officers move 
towards a more standardized medical training program.129 
Evidence-based tactical medical training is desired whenever possible. Military 
medical experts who work to develop and advance TCCC training attempt to compile 
databanks on forensic data from published journals and after-action reports of lessons 
learned. Their efforts are often obstructed by the challenges of collecting data in a combat 
environment. Law enforcement medical researchers might be in a better position to 
collect forensic information than military researchers, due to police officers’ different 
operating environment and generally close proximity to some form of EMS support. If 
multiple levels of the government work together in an effort to collect detailed forensic 
information related to each officer’s injury and have it included on standard fatality 
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